



NEW ZEALAND COUNCIL OF TRADE UNIONS  
*Te Kauae Kaimahi*

**Submission**  
**to the**  
**Minimum Wage Review**  
**2013**

15 November 2013

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## 1. Summary

- 1.1. The following is a summary of our main recommendations. The reasons for them are detailed in the body of the submission.
- 1.2. Our preference is for an immediate rise in the minimum wage to 66 percent of the average ordinary time wage (for April 2013 we estimate this to be \$18.63<sup>1</sup>) to set a clear base. However a possible alternative is to move to this position over three years. Using Treasury forecasts, this would mean a minimum wage of \$19.60 as from 1 April 2016. Two equal percentage increases in the interim would take it to \$15.50 as from 1 April 2014 and \$17.40 as from 1 April 2015.
- 1.3. The CTU would support a mechanism for indexing the minimum wage to the average wage once it has reached a reasonable level.
- 1.4. An increased minimum wage level is needed as a contribution towards:
  - 1.4.1. Addressing the needs of many low income workers
  - 1.4.2. Compensating for rising costs
  - 1.4.3. Narrowing the wage gap with Australia
  - 1.4.4. Providing a safety net for many vulnerable workers
  - 1.4.5. Encouraging employers to invest in raising productivity
  - 1.4.6. Raising New Zealand's low general wage levels
  - 1.4.7. Maintaining domestic demand and employment levels
  - 1.4.8. Reducing New Zealand's high income inequality
  - 1.4.9. Reducing poverty and especially child poverty
  - 1.4.10. Reducing gender inequality
  - 1.4.11. Improving the position of Māori and Pacific workers
  - 1.4.12. Increasing labour participation rates, particularly of disadvantaged groups.

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<sup>1</sup>. We propose that the minimum wage for 2014 is based on 66.0 percent of the estimated average ordinary time hourly rate at 31 March 2014. The average ordinary time wage as at March 2013 in the Quarterly Employment Survey was \$27.48 an hour and we allow for a 2.7 percent increase (Treasury average ordinary-time hourly wage forecast, Budget 2013) to take it to the end of March 2014. Treasury forecasts 2.5 percent increases in the average ordinary-time hourly wage in the years to both March 2015 and March 2016.

- 1.5. The CTU is seeking a return to the previous system of conducting a comprehensive review of the minimum wage annually as the proposed stream lined system provides inadequate opportunity for the social partners to consult on the appropriate level for the minimum wage. Narrowing the criteria and limiting the depth of the review are retrograde steps. The Government has significantly undermined the integrity of the review process by these changes.
- 1.6. Article 7(a) of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights ('ICESCR') and article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights call for State Parties to recognise the right of everyone to "[f]air wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind" and a "decent living for themselves and their families." Through ratification of ICESCR, New Zealand has committed to progressive realisation of these rights. The recent changes to the minimum wage setting process are a step backwards.
- 1.7. New Zealand has committed to the constitution of the ILO which incorporates the Declaration of Philadelphia. article III(d) of the Declaration states that governments have a responsibility to pursue "policies in regard to wages and earnings, hours and other conditions of work calculated to ensure a just share of the fruits of progress to all, and a minimum living wage to all employed and in need of such protection."
- 1.8. ILO Convention No. 131 on Minimum Wage Fixing provides a more modern and effective framework for consultation on wage fixing than ILO Convention No. 26 on Wage Fixing Machinery (which came into force more than 80 years ago). The ILO has urged New Zealand to consider ratification of this convention for several years. We believe there are few and minor obstacles to ratification and recommend that work begin to ratify it.
- 1.9. We note the rapid growth of the Living Wage movement since the last Minimum Wage Review. The CTU and its affiliates are strong supporters of the movement and of Living Wage Aotearoa New Zealand as a means to move towards wages that provide a decent standard of living for all New Zealand households who depend on them. We point out however that while there is an apparent coincidence in value between a Minimum Wage of two-thirds the average wage which we advocate in this submission and the \$18.40 Living Wage calculated by considering the expenditure needs of a household, that is only coincidence and the two concepts are very different. The Living Wage is voluntary for employers whereas the Minimum Wage is a statutory requirement. The Living Wage is calculated by considering "the income necessary to provide workers and their families with the basic necessities of life. A living wage will enable workers to live with dignity and to participate as active citizens in society."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> See <http://www.livingwage.org.nz/>.

- 1.10. The CTU opposes the ‘Starting Out’ rate and advocates moving back to the position where the minimum wage applies fully to those aged 16 years and over.
- 1.11. Changes introduced by the Minimum Wage (Starting-Out Wage) Amendment Act 2013 mean that the training rate for under-20s meets none of our criteria for support and we recommend that this rate is repealed along with other youth subminimum rates.
- 1.12. We propose that MBIE undertakes research on the extent to which training rates are used and the quality of the training received while they are paid less than the full adult minimum wage.
- 1.13. The CTU seeks on-going dialogue in respect to the minimum wage for those aged less than 16 years. We would support a review of the employment of children and additional protective mechanisms for children and young people in work, including a process to enable the ratification of ILO Convention 138. There should be an approach to the ILO to assist us to review our labour and education laws and policy in order to ratify Convention 138 and to provide a threshold for the entry of young people into work which must include the setting of minimum wage levels for young people under 16 years old.
- 1.14. There is a growing loophole in the coverage of the Minimum Wage Act, created by a rise in non-standard working arrangements and the propensity of non-standard employment to be precarious and low paid. On these grounds the CTU believes that current minimum wage protection is excluding an unacceptable number of workers and is increasingly ineffective at extending protection to non-standard working arrangements like contracting. The growth of non-standard work is of increasing concern in undermining good, healthy and safe working conditions and secure and acceptable incomes. Our recent research on insecure work highlights a wide range of such issues<sup>3</sup>.
- 1.15. There should be a government agency charged with gathering more information about low pay in New Zealand. This agency should also collect and publish information on ethnic, migrant and gender aspects of low pay.
- 1.16. More thorough enforcement and stronger penalties should be used to ensure comprehensive adherence to the minimum wage.
- 1.17. The CTU urges a review of the Minimum Wage Exemption Permits. While incomes for people who are on minimum wage exemption are in most cases supplemented by benefits, the current practice is embedding poverty and discrimination and is based on historical and outdated models of disability that prevent people with disabilities having opportunities to basic human and employment rights.

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<sup>3</sup> “Under Pressure: A Detailed Report into Insecure Work in New Zealand”, New Zealand Council of Trade Unions Te Kauae Kaimahi, October 2013, available at <http://union.org.nz/underpressure>.

## 2. Introduction

- 2.1. The New Zealand Council of Trade Unions – Te Kauae Kaimahi (CTU) welcomes the opportunity to make a submission as part of the 2013 minimum wage review. The CTU is the internationally-recognised confederation of trade unions in New Zealand and represents 37 affiliated unions with a membership of over 330,000 workers. The CTU acknowledges Te Tiriti o Waitangi as the founding document of Aotearoa New Zealand and formally acknowledges this through Te Rūnanga o Nga Kaimahi Māori o Aotearoa (Te Rūnanga) the Māori arm of Te Kauae Kaimahi (CTU) which represents approximately 60,000 Māori workers.
- 2.2. New Zealand workers have low wages by the standards of developed countries. The problems this is causing are well known. Three actions are vital in lifting the low wage levels in New Zealand.
- 2.3. Firstly, the minimum wage must be lifted significantly, and this submission makes this case. It represents the wage ‘floor’.
- 2.4. Secondly, we need strong increases in productivity so that higher wages can be sustained and continue to be improved. This is a wider policy issue in which the union movement has been actively involved, to which we would like to see a new commitment from government, and which we have discussed elsewhere.
- 2.5. Thirdly, we need to ensure that productivity is passed on to workers in their wages. This has not been the case in recent years. The most important step to do this is to strengthen collective bargaining. We discuss this further below.
- 2.6. Between 1999 and 2008, several important steps were taken in the area of minimum wages. These included lifting the adult rate, lowering the age of application for the adult rate, increasing the rate for 16/17 year olds from 70 per cent to eventually 100 per cent of the adult rate, benchmarking the rate for trainees, first to no less than the youth rate and then to 80 percent of the adult rate, and limiting the time spent for a 16 or 17 year old on the new entrants rate to 200 hours or 3 months, whichever is the lesser. The minimum wage increased by 36.2 percent in real terms in the decade from 1999 to 2009, in striking contrast to the 0.4 percent increase in real terms over the ten years to 1999. Since 2009 it has increased only 1.1 percent in real terms.
- 2.7. The CTU strongly encourages the Government to increase the momentum on the minimum wage. There is widespread public support for a minimum wage level of at least \$15.00 and that has been the case for some time. While we acknowledge that the Government increased the rate from \$12.50 to \$12.75 from 1 April 2010, to \$13.00 from 1 April 2011, to \$13.50 from 1 April 2012 and to \$13.75 from 1 April 2013, these were only modest increases compared with the 60 percent increase in the Adult minimum achieved between 2000-2008.

- 2.8. Our preference is for an immediate rise in the minimum wage to 66 percent of the average ordinary time wage to set a clear base. For the minimum wage from 1 April 2014 we estimate this to be \$18.63. It is calculated as follows: the average ordinary time wage as at March 2013 in the Quarterly Employment Survey was \$27.48 an hour and we allow for the 2.7 percent increase in average ordinary-time hourly wages forecast by Treasury in Budget 2013 to take it to \$28.22 at the end of March 2014.
- 2.9. However a possible alternative is to move to this position over three years. Using Treasury forecasts of 2.5 percent for each of the years to March 2015 and March 2016, the average wage would reach \$29.65 in March 2016. This would imply a target of a minimum wage of \$19.60 (rounded to the nearest ten cents) as from 1 April 2016. Three equal percentage increases of 12.5 percent in the interim would take it to \$15.50 as from 1 April 2014, \$17.40 as from 1 April 2015, and \$19.60 from 1 April 2016.
- 2.10. Some employer groups may counter that increases impose unbearable costs on employers. But low wages in New Zealand have for some time been more than a social issue or a debate about the balance of competing interests. Low wages are now an intrinsic barrier to economic development in New Zealand with international salary differentials limiting New Zealand's ability to attract or retain (particularly) skilled workers
- 2.11. We also present the now strong international evidence that rises in the minimum wage do not increase unemployment.
- 2.12. Some also argue that there are additions to the minimum wage such as Working for Families and the accommodation supplement which are available to low income people. However they are available only to some: not all have families, or are eligible for other benefits. In any case, it must be asked how far this can be taken as a substitute for adequate market incomes, and whether we want to in effect subsidise wages, thereby encouraging employers to base their business on low wages, with no incentives to invest in increasing productivity or raising skill levels. In any case, we know from members of our affiliates that the current minimum wage is inadequate to support a family, even with those other supplements, and the calculation of the Living Wage supports that experience.
- 2.13. The minimum wage in New Zealand currently stands at around 74 per cent of the Australian federal minimum wage<sup>4</sup> and only 60 percent for casual workers, given that the Australian minimum wage has a 24 percent loading for such workers. The New Zealand minimum wage is even further behind Australia's system of minimum wages under its Modern Award and National Minimum Wage Order system.

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<sup>4</sup> Calculated at an exchange rate of NZ\$1.00 to A\$0.88. It was A\$0.8795 at 7 November 2013 according to the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.

- 2.14. It is well past time for the New Zealand Government to send an unambiguous signal that low wages will not be tolerated in this country.
- 2.15. In sections 3-12 of this submission we address what we consider are the most important issues in considering the level of the minimum wage.

### **3. The Minimum Wage is too low in relative terms**

- 3.1. The minimum wage is currently 49.1 percent of the average hourly wage.<sup>5</sup> This is low by several measures.
- 3.2. The minimum wage is low compared to minimum wages for workers covered by collective agreements. Currently, the average minimum printed weekly wage in collective agreements surveyed by the Industrial Relations Centre at Victoria University is \$637 – or \$15.93 per hour based on a 40-hour week.<sup>6</sup> This is \$87 higher than the current weekly minimum wage.
- 3.3. In historical terms, the ratio is well short of the 66 per cent it reached in April 1973 and even further behind the ratio of 83 per cent when the minimum wage was first introduced in 1946.
- 3.4. The minimum wage affects many workers, and not only those actually on the minimum wage itself, but it is still significantly lower than the wage many low paid workers receive. According to the New Zealand Income Survey for the year to June 2013, half of all 15-19 year olds (45,850 people) receive \$13.75 or less, suggesting that more than that number in fact are on or below the minimum wage. Half of 20-24 year olds (102,000 people) receive less than \$16.22. Half of male part-time wage and salary workers (55,250 people) receive less than \$15.90 an hour, and the equivalent level for women (159,000 people) is \$17.00. From an occupational view point, half of all sales workers (91,100 people) receive less than \$16.00, half of labourers (105,200 people) receive less than \$16.02, and half of community and personal service workers (92,750 people) receive less than \$17.00. Half of workers (154,800 people) in the retail trade and accommodation receive less than \$15.80.
- 3.5. Low income workers have faced steeply rising costs, yet gained the least from the October 2010 tax changes. The real value of the minimum wage at June 2013 was only 15 cents (1.1 percent) more than it was in June 2009. The tax cuts greatly favoured high income earners, increasing the difference in take home pay between someone on \$30,000 a year and someone on \$150,000 a year by \$135 per week. On top of that, they were hit harder than higher income people by the increase in GST. Research for the Tax Working

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<sup>5</sup> Statistics New Zealand, "Quarterly Employment Survey", September data.

<sup>6</sup> Stephen Blumenfeld, Sue Ryall and Peter Kiely, "Employment Agreements: Bargaining Trends & Employment Law Update 2012/2013", Industrial Relations Centre, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, 2013, p.46.

Group in 2009<sup>7</sup> indicates that an equivalised household income near to that of the minimum wage would, following the GST increase, be paying approximately 13 percent of its income on GST, compared to around 8 percent for the median household and 5 percent for the highest disposable income decile. The 2.5 percentage point increase in GST implied an increased cost equivalent to approximately 2.2 percent of their income, compared to 0.9 percent for the highest income decile.

- 3.6. In addition, price rises in general affect households unequally. Household expenditure patterns from the 2010 Household Expenditure Survey (HES) show that the higher the income of a household, the more relief it has had from the fall in interest rates over the past four years because home ownership and debt is much more common in high income than low income households. Including interest payments in a price index constructed from the HES shows that over the five years June 2008 to 2013, low income households (those in the bottom three deciles of household income) experienced prices increasing 2.7 percentage points faster than high income households (those in the top three deciles): by 10.0 percent compared to 7.3 percent). Even without interest payments, low income households' prices rose faster – by 11.7 percent compared to 10.8 percent over that period<sup>8</sup>.
- 3.7. The rapid growth of the Living Wage movement since the last Minimum Wage Review is evidence of growing community concern at the plight of low wage workers and their families. The CTU and its affiliates are strong supporters of the movement and of Living Wage Aotearoa New Zealand as a means to move towards wages that provide a decent standard of living for all New Zealand households who depend on them. Over 170 unions, community and faith-based organisations support the movement, a number which is steadily growing. Both private sector and local government employers are showing interest in implementing the Living Wage for their own employees and contractors.
- 3.8. The New Zealand movement, which is part of an international one which many employers and local governments are committed to, is based on the principle that:<sup>9</sup>

A living wage is the income necessary to provide workers and their families with the basic necessities of life. A living wage will enable workers to live with dignity and to participate as active citizens in society.

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<sup>7</sup> “Changing the rate of GST: fiscal, efficiency, and equity considerations”, Tax Working Group, 2009. Paper prepared by the Policy Advice Division of Inland Revenue and by The Treasury. Available at [http://www.victoria.ac.nz/sacl/cagtr/twg/Publications/GST\\_paper.pdf](http://www.victoria.ac.nz/sacl/cagtr/twg/Publications/GST_paper.pdf)

<sup>8</sup> For further details see “Do price rises hit people on low incomes harder?”, CTU Economic Bulletin 126, July 2011, available at <http://union.org.nz/economicbulletin126>.

<sup>9</sup> See <http://www.livingwagenz.org.nz/>.

We call upon the Government, employers and society as a whole to strive for a living wage for all households as a necessary and important step in the reduction of poverty in New Zealand.

- 3.9. While there is an apparent coincidence in value between a minimum wage of two-thirds the average wage which we advocate in this submission and the \$18.40 Living Wage, that is only coincidence as the two are different concepts. The Living Wage is voluntary for employers whereas the Minimum Wage is a statutory requirement. The Living Wage is calculated by considering the above principles. The level was established by respected researchers in the area of low incomes and poverty, Charles Waldegrave and Peter King<sup>10</sup> by considering the expenditure needs of a family of two adults and two dependent children, with both adults working, one half time and the other full time. The calculation took into account taxes, Working for Families, the Accommodation Supplement, and savings needs including Kiwisaver contributions.
- 3.10. While the Living Wage is expressed as an hourly wage for simplicity, the principle is based on household income. It takes into account ongoing needs and not just immediate ones, and in concept should be seen as considering the needs of the life-cycle of families, not simply at a given point in their progress and development.
- 3.11. The minimum wage is also low compared to Australia. In Australia the national adult minimum hourly wage was raised to A\$16.37 as of 1 July 2013<sup>11</sup>. This is approximately NZ\$18.60 or 35 percent higher than the New Zealand minimum wage in a straight exchange rate conversion. In purchasing power parity terms, it is 22 percent higher.<sup>12</sup>
- 3.12. However the difference is much greater in reality. Firstly, Australia has a loading of 24 percent on the minimum wage for casual workers not covered by an award or agreement. The casual loading is particularly significant in that many people on the minimum wage are likely to be casual workers. For those people, the Australian national minimum wage is 68 percent higher on straight exchange rate conversion and 51 percent higher in purchasing power terms.
- 3.13. Secondly, the Australian minimum wage system is not a single wage as it is in New Zealand. In effect it is a skill-based minimum wage scale, based on

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<sup>10</sup> King, P., & Charles Waldegrave. (2012). Report of an investigation into defining a living wage for New Zealand. Wellington, New Zealand: Family Centre Social Policy Research Unit. Retrieved from <http://www.livingwagenz.org.nz>.

<sup>11</sup> See <http://www.fwc.gov.au/index.cfm?pagename=wagereview2013&page=introduction>

<sup>12</sup> Calculated at an exchange rate of NZ\$1.00 to A\$0.88. It was A\$0.8795 at 7 November 2013 according to the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Purchasing power calculated from OECD Comparative Price Levels for August 2013 (<http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CPL>).

their system of Modern Awards which according to the Australian Government covers 96 percent of private sector employment; it also covers the majority of public sector workers (the main exceptions being some state and local government employees). In principle, all jobs are evaluated into skill classifications (some with sub-classifications), each of which has its own minimum wage, and most awards are now covered by the new system. The table below is taken from the Manufacturing and Associated Industries and Occupations Award 2010, as amended up to 3 June 2013 with New Zealand dollar equivalents added. The lowest skill classification is C14 and its minimum wage is the same as the national minimum wage.

- 3.14. Australia’s minimum wage is therefore considerably higher than New Zealand’s in whatever terms it is compared. It can be more than double what a New Zealand worker would receive.

**Manufacturing and Associated Industries and Occupations Award 2010  
(as amended 3 June 2013)<sup>13</sup>**

Classification level	Minimum weekly wage	Minimum hourly wage				
		\$A	\$A	\$NZ <sup>14</sup>	Above NZ by	\$NZ PPP <sup>15</sup>
C14	622.20	16.37	18.60	35%	16.74	22%
C13	640.20	16.85	19.15	39%	17.23	25%
C12	664.80	17.49	19.88	45%	17.89	30%
C11	687.60	18.09	20.56	50%	18.50	35%
C10	724.50	19.07	21.67	58%	19.50	42%
C9	747.20	19.66	22.34	62%	20.11	46%
C8	769.90	20.26	23.02	67%	20.72	51%
C7	790.50	20.80	23.64	72%	21.27	55%
C6	830.60	21.86	24.84	81%	22.36	63%
C5	847.60	22.31	25.35	84%	22.82	66%
C4	870.30	22.90	26.02	89%	23.42	70%
C3	915.80	24.10	27.39	99%	24.65	79%
C2(a)	938.60	24.70	28.07	104%	25.26	84%
C2(b)	979.70	25.78	29.30	113%	26.37	92%

<sup>13</sup> [http://www.fwa.gov.au/documents/modern\\_awards/award/MA000010/default.htm](http://www.fwa.gov.au/documents/modern_awards/award/MA000010/default.htm)

<sup>14</sup> Calculated at a straight exchange rate conversion of A\$0.785 to NZ\$1.00.

<sup>15</sup> Purchasing Power Parity at August 2010 and 2010 Minimum Wage.

- 3.15. The Award system has a surprisingly pervasive effect in wage determination, reaching about 80 percent of employees according to one study<sup>16</sup>, which also concludes that “much turns on the level at which minimum award rates are set”. It is likely that it has played a significant, if indirect, role in maintaining wage levels in Australia through significant changes in the economy.
- 3.16. The wage gap with Australia is damaging to the New Zealand economy. Net outflows of people to Australia peaked in the year in the August 2012 at 40,000 and there have been continual increases in outflows since 2001. This represents significant losses of workers to Australia. It is time for a significant step to be taken to address this issue and a lift in the minimum wage to \$18.63 would provide that signal.
- 3.17. Migration from New Zealand to Australia is not only by high income workers: it is across the wage and occupational spectrum. In fact one study suggests it is more attractive to lower income and lower skilled workers. For example James Newell<sup>17</sup> using 2006 Census data found that “New Zealand-born workers are 4.3 per cent of all machinery operators and drivers in Australia, and 3.4 per cent of all labourers, but only 2.4 per cent of professionals” although there were some professional categories (including geologists, geophysicists, psychiatrists, anaesthetists and nurses) in which the New Zealand proportion was higher than the average 2.8 per cent of employed people born in New Zealand. “The percentage of NZ-born workers was more than the average in machinery operators and drivers, labourers and technicians and trades workers, at 2.9 per cent. But they were under-represented in all other groups, including managers, community and personal service workers and clerical and administrative workers (all 2.7 per cent), professionals (2.4 per cent) and sales workers (2.3 per cent)”.
- 3.18. Similarly, Richard Manning and Ram SriRamaratnam, using arrival and departure information, found that “The PLT [Permanent and Long-Term] flow data between Australia and New Zealand indicates that New Zealand experienced an outflow of migrants at all different skill groups in each of the past 15 years”.<sup>18</sup> The balance this study finds is somewhat different from Newell’s, but still shows emigration to Australia is across all skill levels: “The largest and most significant outflow of permanent and long-term migrants to Australia has been at the highly skilled, skilled and semi-skilled levels, with

<sup>16</sup> “The significance of minimum wages for the broader wage-setting environment: understanding the role and reach of Australian awards”, by John Buchanan and Gillian Considine, in: “2008 Minimum Wage Research Forum Proceedings, Volume 1”, October 2008, Australian Fair Pay Commission.

<sup>17</sup> Reported in the New Zealand Herald, 2 December 2009, p.A1, “Study confirms Oz 'myth' on unskilled Kiwis”.

<sup>18</sup> “Employment by skills in New Zealand and migrants’ share in its recent growth: trans-Tasman and wider comparisons”, by Richard Manning and Ram SriRamaratnam, Department of Labour, paper presented to the New Zealand Association of Economists conference, June 2010, available at <http://www.nzae.org.nz/conferences/2010/programme.html>.

significantly less migrants categorised at the elementary skilled level departing to Australia. The outflow of migrants from New Zealand to Australia was even higher at the skilled and semi-skilled levels compared to the highly skilled level during the late 1990s. While the level of skilled migrant outflow has dropped off a little since 2000, the semi-skilled migrants has kept up or exceeded the highly skilled category of migrants”.

- 3.19. Clearly, the Government’s goal, if it still exists, of income parity with Australia by 2025 must pay as much attention to low income workers as to anyone else.
- 3.20. The most effective way to ensure that the minimum wage is set at a reasonable level is to index it to the average wage. As noted by Dowrick and Quiggin<sup>19</sup> there are sound reasons to index the minimum wage to average or median wages. They state that in order to avoid further widening of inequality, and to avoid the exacerbation of poverty traps, minimum wages need to be indexed not to the Consumer Price Index but to the average or median wage – allowing workers in low-pay occupations to share in the benefits of rising productivity. Indexing is also recognised as a vital mechanism to maintain the value of NZ Superannuation.
- 3.21. Herr, Kazandziska and Mahnkopf-Praprotnik<sup>20</sup> in an analysis of the theory of minimum wage, put forward the following principles:
- a. Minimum wages must affect a sufficient number of employees – they must be “in touch” with the existing wage structure in a country.
  - b. They should be adjusted frequently, usually annually.
  - c. They should increase at least according to trend productivity growth plus the target inflation rate of the central bank. Otherwise they cannot help to establish a wage anchor against deflation efficiently.
  - d. They should increase at least in line with average wages because this is the only possibility to prevent an increase in the wage gap. As long as low wages are considered to be too low in comparison to average wages, minimum wages should increase faster than average wages.
- 3.22. The CTU submits that it is time that the New Zealand Government accepted the International Labour Organisation (ILO) guideline that the minimum wage should be based on the general level of wages and index it at approximately two-thirds of the average wage which is close to the recommended

<sup>19</sup> Steve Dowrick and John Quiggin. “A Survey of the Literature on Minimum Wages”. Australian National University and University of Queensland, February 2003, pg 6.

<sup>20</sup> Hansjörg Herr, Mika Kazandziska and Silke Mahnkopf-Praprotnik, “The Theoretical Debate about Minimum Wages” Working Paper No. 6, Global Labour University Working Papers. Berlin: Global Labour University, p.24. Retrieved from 1.1. [http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed\\_dialogue/---actrav/documents/publication/wcms\\_115075.pdf](http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---actrav/documents/publication/wcms_115075.pdf)

European Social Standard<sup>21</sup>. In October 2008, the European Parliament passed a resolution on “promoting social inclusion and combating poverty, including child poverty, in the EU”. Among other measures, it “Calls on the Council to agree an EU target for minimum wages (statutory, collective agreements at national, regional or sectoral level) to provide for remuneration of at least 60 percent of the relevant (national, sectoral, etc.) average wage and, further, to agree a timetable for achieving that target in all Member States.”<sup>22</sup>

- 3.23. Although there were significant increases in the minimum wage early in this century and increases ranging from modest to inadequate over the last three years, there is also evidence of widening income disparities. One way of reducing this disparity is to adopt indexation at an adequate level.
- 3.24. We therefore propose a goal of setting the minimum wage at 66 percent of the ordinary time average wage, to be reached within three years. At 1 April 2014, we calculate that would be \$18.63, based on the average ordinary time wage of \$27.48 at 31 March 2013, and estimated increase in the average wage of 2.7 percent between then and 1 April 2014 (using Treasury 2013 Budget forecasts). A slower transition to this of three equal percentage increases to 66 percent of the estimated average wage on 1 April 2016 would take it to \$15.50 as from 1 April 2014, \$17.40 as from 1 April 2015, and \$19.60 from 1 April 2016.

#### **4. The Minimum Wage is an important safety net**

- 4.1. MBIE estimated<sup>23</sup> that 91,500 workers would be directly affected by the 2012 increase of the minimum wage to \$13.75 an hour, a rise from 90,600 affected by the previous year’s increase.
- 4.2. However as noted above, the New Zealand Income Survey for June 2013 showed 61,000 15-19 year olds in part-time work, with a median hourly wage exactly equal to the current minimum wage: \$13.75. It showed 91,700 15-19 year olds in wage and salary jobs, again with a median hourly wage of the minimum wage, \$13.75. This shows that the majority of young workers are

<sup>21</sup> The ILO does not recommend a precise level of the minimum wage. However Recommendation 30 in relation to ILO Convention 26 notes that the minimum wage should be set in relation to the general level of wages in the country. As Peter Brosnan from Griffith University has argued in *Can Australia Afford Low Pay?* that an appropriate guide to level can be found in the European Social Charter ‘decency threshold’ which suggests 68 per cent of the adult mean wage. Brosnan also suggests that 60 per cent could also be a reasonable level.

<sup>22</sup> European Parliament resolution of 9 October 2008 on promoting social inclusion and combating poverty, including child poverty, in the EU (2008/2034(INI)), available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2008-0467&language=EN>.

<sup>23</sup> Minimum Wage Review Regulatory Impact Statement 2012, available at <http://www.dol.govt.nz/er/pay/backgroundpapers/2012/index.asp>.

on the minimum wage and would benefit from an increase. In addition, many older workers are also on the minimum wage. Those close to the minimum wage are also likely to benefit as employers move to retain pay relativity.

- 4.3. It needs to be clearly acknowledged by the Government that the removal of the award system in 1991 has had a devastating effect on the wage levels of a large proportion of the workforce. In 1990 – the year before the Employment Contracts Act 1991 (ECA) removed national awards – almost half of the private sector workforce was covered by collective bargaining. The promotion of collective bargaining by the Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA) is important, but it has not reinstated the award system. Given the very weak measures in the ERA to support industry or occupational agreements on pay and conditions, the abolition of the award system places much greater emphasis on universal policy tools like the minimum wage.
- 4.4. Under the award system the minimum wage was primarily a device to cover gaps in award coverage. Since the introduction of the ECA, and still so under the ERA, the minimum wage now sets fundamentals of socially acceptable employment across a majority of the workforce. While the CTU considers that there are better employment relations regimes that should be adopted, the status quo, which has been further weakened by the present government, is a choice that governments have made, and they should not shirk from their resulting responsibility to set and maintain the minimum wage at a meaningful level as we have described above.
- 4.5. Grimshaw, Bosh and Rubery<sup>24</sup> conclude that the impact of the minimum wage in raising wage levels generally is weakened in an environment of low levels of unionisation and weak collective bargaining. Thus while a higher minimum wage is important, its effectiveness in reducing inequality is muted in New Zealand’s unsupportive environment for effective unions and collective bargaining.
- 4.6. Colm McLaughlin<sup>25</sup> notes that low-paid workers, particularly those in small workplaces, remain dependent on employment legislation to improve their position.
- 4.7. We know from a 2007 study<sup>26</sup> (though it is time for this to be updated) the characteristics of those who are affected most by increases in the minimum wage – they are aged under 25 years, female, married female, part time,

<sup>24</sup> Grimshaw, D., Bosch, G., & Rubery, J. (2013). Minimum Wages and Collective Bargaining: What Types of Pay Bargaining Can Foster Positive Pay Equity Outcomes? *British Journal of Industrial Relations*. [doi:10.1111/bjir.12021](https://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12021).

<sup>25</sup> “The Productivity-Enhancing Impacts of the Minimum Wage: Lessons from Denmark, New Zealand and Ireland”, by Colm McLaughlin, 2007, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 342.

<sup>26</sup> “Minimum wage workers: Who are they?” by Jason Timmins, Department of Labour 2007, PANZ Conference, 3 July 2007.

those studying, and workers in services related occupations, as well as the retail and hospitality industry. Part time workers from Māori, Pacific, Asian, Middle Eastern, Latin American, and African, and “other” ethnic groups (a total of 125,300 people) all have median wages at or under \$15.50 and are therefore likely to have large numbers on or very near the minimum wage.

- 4.8. In this context, even more stress will be placed on low income, casual and part time employment opportunities as the Government implements the recommendations of the Welfare Working Group to force more people into the workforce. While we support the creation of an environment in which welfare beneficiaries are able to move back into work easily, their move must have a high degree of choice so that it matches their and their dependants’ needs, and it must lead to improved financial and social conditions, not worse. It requires an economy in which there is low unemployment and a variety of work opportunities which both allow for flexibility in personal circumstances and decent wages and working conditions.
- 4.9. Given that many beneficiaries will have young dependent children, or may have health problems or disabilities, their job choices will be greatly constrained. While it should not be assumed that all beneficiaries are low skilled, the Department of Labour has found that “People on benefits tend to have lower job related skills when compared to individuals not on a benefit”<sup>27</sup>. But in any case, their circumstances dictate that the impact of pushing more of them into work will be primarily on the low wage end of the labour market.
- 4.10. The current high rate of unemployment will not help the outcome, but even assuming unemployment falls over several years, given the target of moving 100,000 people from welfare benefits into the workforce over 10 years, the cumulative effect will be a major shock to an employed workforce of 2.2 million people and even greater to the part of the labour market it is likely to impact.
- 4.11. Without countervailing action, this will tend to force down wage rates and encourage poor employer practices to take advantage of these workers who have no choice but to take whatever work is offered that minimally suits their circumstances in the view of the authorities enforcing welfare benefit conditions. The harsh welfare cuts and employment law changes in the early 1990s were accompanied by a minimum wage which fell both against the average wage and in real terms for most of the decade and did not pass its March 1990 real value or its relativity with the average wage again until June 2000. There was no minimum wage for young workers until a very low youth rate was introduced in 1994. While labour market participation rates rose, unemployment was little lower than or above the high current rate for the

<sup>27</sup> “Labour Market Dynamics and Future Challenges: An Issues Paper for the Welfare Working Group”, Robert Haig, Department of Labour, available at [http://ips.ac.nz/WelfareWorkingGroup/Downloads/Working\\_papers/DoL-paper-on-labour-markets.pdf](http://ips.ac.nz/WelfareWorkingGroup/Downloads/Working_papers/DoL-paper-on-labour-markets.pdf).

whole decade and the real average ordinary time wage was unchanged from 1990 to 1996. While welfare benefit conditions and the minimum wage were only one part of this picture, the risks are clear.

4.12. The minimum wage is one aspect of minimum conditions which will come under severe stress, and the importance of enforcing and improving these conditions will become even greater to prevent such “welfare” policies becoming a licence for employers to exploit workers in this situation, and for general levels of wages and conditions to be forced down. Without such conditions such as this, it is difficult to see society’s “welfare” being improved. It would be a road map for continuing down the path of a low wage economy rather than one based on high skills and wages.

4.13. The Welfare Working Group’s report contends<sup>28</sup> that:

Better employment outcomes would lift household incomes leading to improved outcomes for people and their children who are at risk of welfare dependency. It would lead to better economic outcomes as firms find it easier to recruit and reduced fiscal costs by upwards of \$1 billion per year for taxpayers.

4.14. If however they are forced into employment which is low wage and with poor conditions, the leap of logic from “more employment” to “improved outcomes” simply will not follow. Without good employment protections they may well add to the existing army of working poor, associated with low incomes and insecurity. Working conditions and wage rates of other workers will be damaged in the process.

4.15. The social outcomes from poor jobs can be damaging as from unemployment and long periods out of the workforce. The U.K. Marmot Review of Health Inequalities found:<sup>29</sup>

However jobs need to be sustainable and offer a minimum level of quality, to include not only a decent living wage, but also opportunities for in-work development, the flexibility to enable people to balance work and family life, and protection from adverse working conditions ...

Insecure and poor quality employment is also associated with increased risks of poor physical and mental health. There is a graded relationship between a person’s status at work and how much control and support they have there. These factors, in turn, have biological effects and are related to increased risk of ill-health. Work is good – and unemployment bad – for physical and mental health, but the

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<sup>28</sup> “Reducing Long Term Benefit Dependency: Recommendations”, February 2011, Welfare Working Group, p.60.

<sup>29</sup> “Fair Society, Healthy Lives: A Strategic Review of Health Inequalities in England Post-2010”, M. Marmot et al, 2010; London: The Marmot Review. Available at <http://www.marmotreview.org>.

quality of work matters. Getting people off benefits and into low paid, insecure and health-damaging work is not a desirable option.

- 4.16. An extensive literature review of “Influences of Maternal Employment and Early Childhood Education on Young Children’s Cognitive and Behavioural Outcomes”<sup>30</sup> for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs found that

...employment conditions are important in relation to the mother’s time spent away from home and parenting behaviours. Research indicates that low job satisfaction and work-place tension have negative impacts on child development (OECD, 2003: 138). Difficult job conditions create psychological distress, which affects parenting, which affects child outcomes...

Part-time work and family-friendly policies that allow parents time with young children have a positive impact on cognitive development (OECD, 2003: 138). Family-friendly workplace policies can help to reduce negative stress (for example, Reynolds, Callender and Edwards, 2003). However, part-time work, the most common ‘flexible arrangement’ for women, can reduce career prospects and opportunities. Part-time work conditions are generally worse than full-time work: fewer promotion opportunities, fewer financial benefits (such as less superannuation and sick and annual leave) and fewer training opportunities (Bittman, Hoffman and Thompson, 2004: 47). In addition, part-time work is available only in a small range of sectors, constraining women’s choices and career opportunities (Byrne, 2002: 17–18).

- 4.17. Similarly, a wider literature review by Roopali Johri for the Department of Labour found:<sup>31</sup>

Workers’ income can suffer from poor quality employment, as can their health (both at work, as well as outside of it), their training prospects and hence their productivity, [and] their ability to influence decisions about their job such as their working hours. Accepting any job does not necessarily improve a worker’s chances of getting into better quality employment. In other words, poor quality employment can adversely affect not only a worker’s quality of working life, but also their overall quality of life, including their family life. Employers can experience low quality employment in lower productivity, and recruitment and retention costs. Eventually, society and the economy can be constrained by such costs, reflected in productivity, business standards, economic growth and employment rates.

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http://

<sup>30</sup> Brewerton, Melissa, “Influences of Maternal Employment and Early Childhood Education on Young Children’s Cognitive and Behavioural Outcomes”, Ministry of Women’s Affairs, October 2004, p.28.

<sup>31</sup> “Work Values and the Quality of Employment: A Literature Review”, Roopali Johri, 2005, Department of Labour, Wellington.

4.18. And further:<sup>32</sup>

Low quality jobs are usually dead-end ‘McJobs’ with little training to improve the worker’s human capital and their chances of moving to better quality jobs. Hence, a bad job is seldom a stepping stone to a better job.”

4.19. This view is backed up by recent OECD research into inequality. The 2011 report, *Divided We Stand*<sup>33</sup> specifically urged “inclusive” employment practices – including greater protection for temporary workers – as a means of tackling in-work poverty. It noted that countries should create “jobs that enable people to avoid and escape poverty. Recent trends towards higher rates of in-work poverty indicate that job quality has become a concern for a growing number of workers. Policy reforms that tackle inequalities in the labour market, such as those between standard and non-standard forms of employment, are needed...”

4.20. Low-wage, low-quality work may also be harmful to the long-term employment prospects of parents. As John Schmitt points out:<sup>34</sup>

Low-wage jobs, like spells of unemployment, may, for example, be associated with the erosion of a worker’s accumulated skills. If so, a worker’s long-term earnings potential would be enhanced more by a period of education and training than by working in a low-wage job ... Based on an analysis of data for the United Kingdom, Stewart, for example, finds that low wage work has ‘almost as large an adverse effect as unemployment’ on low-wage workers’ future employment prospects.

4.21. Such forms of work also make on-the-job training less attractive to employers. If the workers are employees, high staff turnover means returns to the investment in training become too risky. If the workers are contractors, or employees of contractors, or labour hire firms, no employer has the incentive and certainty to train employees for what may be limited periods of employment in one position.

4.22. Firms may well “find it easier to recruit” if parents of young children, people with health problems and other welfare beneficiaries are forced to take unsatisfactory jobs, but it could well be at the expense of good jobs, incentives to increase productivity and employment conditions, and increased reliance on low wages for competitive advantage. Professor Paul

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid. p 2.

<sup>33</sup> OECD, (2011) “Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising”, OECD Publishing.

<sup>34</sup> Schmitt, John (2012) “Low-wage lessons”, Center for Economic and Policy Research, Washington DC, USA, January 2012, at 9.

Dalziel's paper "Welfare and Social Sector Policy and Reform: Options and Alternatives"<sup>35</sup> covers many of these issues.

- 4.23. Many participants in the National Conversation about Work project undertaken by the Human Rights Commission in 2009<sup>36</sup> talked about the difficulties they experienced making ends meet. One participant said that workers on low wages seek longer hours to gain an adequate income. A cleaner stated "I have seen some older people work two to three jobs to make ends meet". Other people working in jobs at or just above the minimum wage felt the cost of tertiary study put their aspirations of career advancement out of reach.
- 4.24. As well as the low paid local workforce, the increasing demand for temporary migrant labour in New Zealand creates another group of workers vulnerable to low pay. Alarming, some industry groups have pointed to the minimum wage as the de facto market rate for migrant workers.
- 4.25. As discussed in more detail in Section 11, income and wealth inequality are high in New Zealand, having grown rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s.
- 4.26. An Auckland University of Technology study has also found evidence of widespread practices of illegally paying migrant student workers below the minimum wage. Similarly there is evidence of other migrants being illegally underpaid<sup>37</sup>. While there are now initiatives that begin to address the migrant exploitation problem, the fact that these breaches have not been picked up earlier indicates a general enforcement problem.
- 4.27. In light of these conditions, the importance of employment in current social security systems and the degree of inequality, the minimum wage is a vital safety net. It is important that the minimum wage is vigorously enforced and that it is returned to a socially acceptable level of 66 per cent of the average wage.

## **5. A low Minimum Wage is symptomatic of low wages in general**

- 5.1. In general, wages in New Zealand are low – in absolute terms, relative to Australia and other OECD countries, and in terms of an economic transformation in New Zealand to a high skill, high wage, and high value economy.
- 5.2. New Zealand's wages are still recovering from being at historically low levels. Data provided with the published book, "The New Zealand Economy:

<sup>35</sup> AERU Research Unit, Lincoln University, June 2011,

<sup>36</sup> "What Next? National Conversation about Work", Human Rights Commission, New Zealand. 2010.

<sup>37</sup> "Battle for a living wage: Students obliged to take jobs at well below minimum wage", Lincoln Tan, New Zealand Herald 12 February 2013, available at [http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c\\_id=1&objectid=10864809](http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10864809)

An Introduction” by Ralph Lattimore and Shamubeel Equb (Auckland University Press) along with current wage series, shows that the average hourly wage peaked in September 2013 dollar terms in March 1982 at \$30.75 compared to \$27.99 in September 2013. It reached its lowest in recent years in June 1995 when it was \$22.96, a level not seen since March 1970.

- 5.3. This cannot be dismissed as simply a symptom of a low-growth economy, despite well-known concerns about New Zealand’s rate of GDP and productivity growth. If labour productivity growth is seen as a benchmark for wage growth, as is commonly held, then New Zealand wages have fallen far behind this benchmark. New Zealand workers have seen little of the productivity gains reflected in their wages.
- 5.4. While labour productivity increased by 36.5 percent in the measured sector (most of the private sector) from 1993 to 2012, real wages<sup>38</sup> as measured by the Labour Cost Index (LCI) for all labour costs fell by 3.9 percent against the CPI and 5.6 percent against the Producer Price Index for Outputs (PPO – which reflects the employer’s revenue as a result of employing workers) over this 19 year period.<sup>39</sup> The average total hourly wage, which includes increases for recognition of individuals and reflects changes in labour market composition, rose in real terms only 16.1 percent (CPI) or 14.0 percent (PPO) over that period. From 1989 it rose only 16.3 percent (CPI) or 16.9 percent (PPO) while productivity rose 50.4 percent.<sup>40</sup>
- 5.5. Over the approximate period of the ECA (March 1991-March 2001), labour productivity rose 25.6 percent but the average total hourly wage rose in real terms only 8.0 percent (CPI) or 5.4 percent (PPO). Over the approximate period of the ERA (March 2001 to March 2012), labour productivity rose 12.1 percent but the average total hourly wage rose in real terms only 8.0 percent (CPI) or 6.3 percent (PPO). The more recent employment regime saw higher wage increases compared to annual productivity growth, but productivity growth still considerably exceeded real wage growth.
- 5.6. Care is needed with productivity-wage comparisons over a short run and across incomplete business cycles because firms may build excess labour or production capacity in anticipation of expansion, or be unable to utilise their full capacity during a downturn so that their productivity may vary

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<sup>38</sup> In this and the following paragraphs discussing the comparison of wages and productivity, both the wages measures are for the measured sector (the industries over which Statistics New Zealand has measured productivity) or for the private sector where that is not available (since 2009). For productivity, the measured sector, for which latest statistics begin in 1996, is extended back to 1989 using the somewhat less extensive Former Measured Sector.


<sup>39</sup> Statistics New Zealand, Productivity, CPI, PPO and Labour Cost Index.

<sup>40</sup> Statistics New Zealand, Quarterly Employment Survey.

significantly over different parts of a cycle.<sup>41</sup> However we note that between 2008 and 2012, productivity rose 2.5 percent but the real average total hourly wage rose by only 1.3 percent (CPI) or 0.7 percent (PPO). Real LCI for all labour costs fell 1.9 percent (CPI) or 2.5 percent (PPO) over the same period.

5.7. A further demonstration of the relative position of wages in the economy is provided by the Labour Share of GDP. This shows the proportion of income generated by the economy that goes to labour in wages or other labour costs. The remaining proportion, Operating Surplus, goes to capital, mainly in the form of interest and dividends. The accompanying graph compares that of New Zealand to Australia. Both have fallen over the period 1972-2009 but New Zealand's fell much more

steeply, and continued to fall during the 1990s when Australia's labour share flattened. New Zealand's has risen since 2002 but appears to be flattening again, at a level 10 percentage points of GDP behind where it was in the early 1980s. New Zealand's labour share has been lower than Australia's over almost the entire period. It is unlikely that this is due to greater capital deepening in New Zealand – all the evidence suggests the contrary. Again, this indicates low wages in New Zealand not only in relative terms, but in terms of what the country could afford.




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5.8. The comparison of New Zealand's labour share with Australia is not unique. In fact, New Zealand has one of the lowest labour shares in the OECD according to OECD data. As shown in the accompanying graph, only the Slovak Republic and Mexico have a lower share, though Turkey is also lower.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>41</sup> For a more detailed analysis see "Real wages and productivity in New Zealand", presented at the 14th Conference on Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand, Wellington, 2010, Industrial Relations Centre, Victoria University of Wellington, proceedings forthcoming.

<sup>42</sup> Source: OECD.



5.9. The measure graphed here is slightly different from the labour share previously described in that it includes the imputed labour income of the self-employed and working proprietors. It is also known as the “Real Unit Labour Cost” and is a measure of the labour cost of producing one unit of output in the economy. This is another indication that New Zealand has very low labour costs relative to the rest of the OECD.

5.10. It is therefore essential that any increase in productivity is accompanied by mechanisms to ensure it is fairly distributed in wages. The minimum wage is one such mechanism, and indexing it to productivity and wages strengthens that connection. Another very effective mechanism is to strengthen collective bargaining. We discuss productivity in more detail below.


5.11. According to data from the Industrial Relations Centre at Victoria University, approximately 20 percent of the non-agricultural workforce is covered by collective bargaining,<sup>43</sup> but their wage rates have increased significantly faster than the workforce in general. From June 1993 to June 2000 under the ECA which made collective bargaining very difficult and opened it to non-union parties, real wages measured by the LCI after CPI inflation did not rise at all – that is, 0 percent per year. At the same time, real wages in collective agreements (measured by the average adult minimum wage in them, after inflation) went up by 0.3 percent per year. During the ERA period from June

<sup>43</sup> “Employment Agreements: Bargaining Trends and Employment Law Update 2012/2013”, Stephen Blumenfeld, Sue Ryall and Peter Kiely, Industrial Relations Centre, Victoria University of Wellington, 2013. Calculated from data on p. 25, which the authors warn may underestimate coverage.

2003 to June 2012, when only union collectives were permitted, and after all non-union collectives had expired, real wages measured by the LCI fell 0.2 percent a year. Over that period, real wages in collectives went up by 0.7 percent per year. Increases were not generous in either period, but there is a consistent picture of collectives doing better than individual agreements.

5.12. New Zealand’s unemployment rate until 2008 had been at or below 4 percent for an extended period (3.9 percent in September 2004 through to 4.0 per cent in June 2008 seasonally adjusted<sup>44</sup>). A number of indicators suggest that the combination of low unemployment, strong increases in the minimum wage, the 2004 amendments to the ERA, and union campaigning based on collective bargaining created a short period of stronger wage growth between approximately 2004 and 2008 which carried on into 2009 as the result of multi-year settlements.

5.13. Since then, average wages have returned to slow real growth which has not kept up with productivity growth, and have not benefited from high commodity prices New Zealand producers are receiving. Median earnings have fallen further behind average earnings. In an environment of low and relatively unresponsive wage rates, and in light of the issues around productivity and economic transformation, a low minimum wage is symbolic of an economy with a low-skill, low technology approach to employment.



5.14. The intention should be to come out of this recession in a fit state to improve productivity, skills, and technology. This should be built on the provision of better wages, not low cost labour.


5.15. OECD private sector hourly earnings and consumer price statistics show that between 1990 and 2013, real hourly earnings in the private sector increased by 45.7 percent in Australia but only 16.9 percent in New Zealand. From 2000-2013, private sector real hourly earnings rose 26.6 percent in

<sup>44</sup> Statistics New Zealand, “Household Labour Force Survey”, accessed through Infoshare.

Australia and 9.6 percent in New Zealand. They rose 9.7 percent between 2009 and 2013 in Australia (and 2.7 percent in the last year) but rose only 0.1 percent and 1.5 percent respectively in New Zealand. For the period 1996-2013 (for which richest OECD data is available), New Zealand had the 8th lowest increase among 18 OECD countries, from 2000-2009, 7th lowest from 19 countries and from 2009-2013, 6th lowest out of 19 countries (and it would still be approximately 10th lowest if the 2010 GST increase had not taken place). The 2009-13 ranking is particularly surprising given that New Zealand’s economy as a whole was less affected by the global recession than most of the OECD.

5.16. Average fulltime adult ordinary time earnings in Australia were A\$37.39 in May 2013,<sup>45</sup> and New Zealand average ordinary time earnings were NZ\$27.53 in June 2013. At straight exchange rate conversion the Australian rate was \$42.49 or 54 percent higher than the New Zealand equivalent. In purchasing power terms it was worth NZ\$38.24 or 39 percent higher. Even if we add 7.0 percent to the New Zealand average wage to make allowance for it including part-time workers,<sup>46</sup> so estimating the average ordinary time wage for fulltime workers to be \$29.46, the gap is still 44 percent on the exchange rate comparison, and 30 percent in purchasing power terms.

5.17. The gap rose during the 1990s and 2000s until about 2005, and then fell until the beginning of the global financial crisis. Since 2008, Australian wages have continued to grow rapidly in real terms while New Zealand wages have only recently passed 2009 levels in real terms leading to the gap widening again. The graph above shows the difference between New Zealand and Australian wages in purchasing power terms using both the ordinary time hourly wage and the average weekly wage including overtime (which is the



<sup>45</sup> Average weekly full time ordinary time earnings, seasonally adjusted, were A\$1,420.90 in May 2013 (Australian Bureau of Statistics). This is divided by 38 to obtain hourly earnings. Purchasing power is estimated using the latest (August 2013) OECD values for Comparative Price Levels between New Zealand and Australia.


<sup>46</sup> This is the difference between median hourly earnings for fulltime and all wage and salary earners shown in the New Zealand Income Survey, June 2012. It was 7.9 percent in 2011.

most directly comparable measure).<sup>47</sup>

5.18. This does not take full account of casual employment loadings paid in Australia, nor does it include their substantial compulsory employer superannuation contributions. All employee benefits can be included by comparing compensation of employees (an aggregate from the National Accounts) per hour worked. The following graph shows the gap in the period we have data for (March years 1987-2012):


- in exchange rate terms, which was at its highest ever at 74 percent in the year to March 2012;
- in GDP purchasing power terms which approximate those for firms and was at 35 percent in 2012, having peaked at 47 percent in 2005; and
- in consumer purchasing power terms (actual private individual consumption) which was at 34 percent 2012 having peaked at 44 percent in 2005.

5.19. The pattern at purchasing power is very similar to that for the average wage, but the gap is much larger. The exchange rate conversion shows a quite different pattern, driven much by the volatility in the exchange rate rather than wages themselves, though in a rising trend. The exchange rate conversion is what is seen by Australian businesses contracting work to New Zealand firms and therefore not experiencing New Zealand output prices (such as call centres).



5.20. The difference in wage dynamics between the two countries can also be seen in a comparison between New Zealand’s Labour Cost Index and Australia’s Wage Price Index, nearly identical measures. Both are indexes so show only movements in levels of wages and other costs, but in real terms, the New Zealand LCI has been virtually flat or falling slightly since it began in 1992. However the Australian WPI, which is available only since 1997, has risen in real terms as the accompanying graph shows.

5.21. The stagnant nature of wage levels in New Zealand has been in striking contrast to corporate profits. As already noted, there has been a long term shift in the balance between income to employees and returns to capital (gross operating surplus). Until 1993, employees received a greater (though rapidly falling) share of



the economy’s output than capital did. In 1981 for example, employees received 59.7 percent of GDP and capital received 40.3 percent.<sup>48</sup> From 1993 until 2007 the position was reversed. A small part of that growth was from rising numbers of self-employed due to employees being forced into contracting rather than employment relationships, but most was due to the stagnation or fall in real wage and salary incomes. The imbalance in how the growing production of the economy is shared (which also shows up in New Zealand’s high levels of income inequality) is clearly a systemic issue which got steeply worse until about 2002 when capital received a record 53.9 percent of GDP. After that, the imbalance moderated but has a long way to go to return to historical levels.

5.22. Executive pay has also risen steeply. One survey<sup>49</sup> showed that whereas in 2000, a CEO could expect to earn eight times as much as the pay of the average worker, by 2006, the average CEO pay-packet was 19 times the average wage.

<sup>48</sup> Allocating taxes on production less subsidies to them proportionately.

<sup>49</sup> See <http://www.neon.org.nz/newsarchive/nzlwe/>.

5.23. From reports in the *New Zealand Herald* the following picture emerged for New Zealand’s top executives’ pay:

<b>Year</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>
<b># of NZ’s largest companies</b>	44	56	49
<b>% increase</b>	23%	8%	25%*
<b>Average CEO salary</b>	\$1.018m	\$1.056m	\$1.217m
<b>Ratio to the NZ average wage</b>	25	27	25
<b>Ratio to the NZ min wage</b>	50	45	49

\*14% if one-off payouts to CEOs who left are excluded.

Source: *NZ Herald* "Richer than ever before" – 22 Mar 2008; "Price of success - what our chief executives earn" – 7 Apr 2007; "Top executives' pay averages \$1m" – 15 April 2006.

5.24. Similarly the *New Zealand Herald* of 8 June 2012 reported that while New Zealand’s highest paid CEO’s had suffered an average 0.4 percent decrease in pay between 2004 and 2010 the average chief executive pay packet ballooned by almost 80 per cent, while the number of chief executives earning more than \$1 million rose from six to 26.

5.25. A survey of 39 companies by Tim Hunter published in the *Sunday Star Times*, in October 2013<sup>50</sup> found that “The pay between the pay of top chief executives and the staff they manage appears to be growing. In the latest Fairfax annual survey of pay rates at listed companies, the average pay of CEOs in 2012 was 26.4 times that of the average employee in the same companies. That’s up from a multiple of 22.5 times in 2011.” CEO pay was rising faster on average than what they paid their staff. The highest multiple was at Skycity Entertainment Group whose CEO was paid 70.9 times as much as the average for his employees.

5.26. This is not a recent phenomenon. Helen Roberts of Otago University analysed New Zealand listed company annual reports from 1997 to 2002 and found CEOs’ pay rose at a median rate of 5.3 percent per year after inflation while their executive employees’ pay rose only 1.5 percent per year after inflation. She found that “real median CEO compensation increased from 9 to 12 times real median worker income during the period”. Notably, she analysed the performance of the companies and found only a weak relationship to pay, finding in fact that “lower paid CEOs tend to outperform higher paid CEOs and implies that higher paid CEOs may be extracting rents”<sup>51</sup>.

5.27. The CTU recognises that wages will not increase simply through a mechanism such as the annual review of the minimum wage. We recognise

<sup>50</sup> “Bosses' pay rises outpace workers’”, Tim Hunter, 6 October 2013, *Sunday Star Times*, p. D1, D4.

<sup>51</sup> Roberts, H. M. (2005). CEO power, executive compensation and firm performance, New Zealand, 1997-2002. Dunedin, New Zealand: University of Otago. Retrieved from <http://hdl.handle.net/10523/1524>.

the significant increases in investment in skill development. Such investment in people can lift wages over a period, if it is alongside union collective bargaining and wider programmes to invest in new technology and infrastructure and engage workers in workplace and industry issues. Responsible contracting policies in which government contracts require appropriate working conditions and pay rates can also help. But the symbolic and flow-on effect of minimum wage increases can play a vital role.

- 5.28. As well as underscoring the need for increased minimum wages, low wages point to the need for increased research into the nature of low pay in New Zealand. As such, the CTU continues to advocate the development of a Low Pay Unit to collect appropriate data about the extent and impact of low pay in this country.

## **6. Implications for productivity**

- 6.1. Employers may point to higher costs or slowing economic growth in the current recession to challenge the case for further increases in the minimum wage. But the argument about increasing wages in New Zealand – including the minimum wage – is bigger than the short-term economic climate. Higher wages are a key part of New Zealand’s economic transformation. To date employers have failed to address the issue of low wages in this context.
- 6.2. While the minimum wage is only one policy lever, a significant lift in the minimum wage would chart a clear course in terms of productivity enhancement alongside high labour market participation, rather than continued employer reliance on employment creation through low paid jobs with poor levels of physical capital per worker. The minimum wage can stimulate reform by reducing employers’ ability to reduce wage rates to maintain their viability, and focus attention on raising productivity as the instrument of commercial adjustment.
- 6.3. There is evidence<sup>52</sup> that an increase in the minimum wage can be associated with a small, but statistically significant, increase in average productivity in low-wage industries compared with other industries.
- 6.4. A 2011 study of recent significant increases in the federal minimum wage in the US makes this more concrete. “Channels of Adjustment in Labor Markets: The 2007-2009 Federal Minimum Wage Increase”, by Tetyana Zelenska,<sup>53</sup> investigates the impact of the 2007-2009 increases from \$US5.15 to \$US7.25 an hour. The study tracked store-level payroll records

<sup>52</sup> See -. “Assessing the Impact of Labour Market Policies on Productivity: a Difference-in-Differences Approach, Andrea Bassanini and Danielle Venn”, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 54, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/20/38797288.pdf>.

<sup>53</sup> “Channels of Adjustment in Labor Markets: The 2007-2009 Federal Minimum Wage Increase”, by Tetyana Zelenska, 2011, Economics Dissertations, Georgia State University, Paper 70, [http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/econ\\_diss/70](http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/econ_diss/70).

for individual employees in quick-service restaurant chains in Georgia and Alabama. The impact of the increases in the minimum wage varied significantly across restaurants, but the analysis finds no negative effect on employment and hours. This is important in itself, adding to the growing evidence of “no significant impact” from even quite large minimum wage increases, but the author went on to interview managers and employees as to the “channels of adjustment” used to address the increased cost.

- 6.5. Twenty-three different cost-saving measures were identified. The measures which were cited by more than 80 percent of managers were: increasing workers’ performance standards, adjustments to work schedules, cross-training of workers for multi-tasking, expanding job duties of workers, discouraging overtime work, tightening up on absenteeism and discipline, getting more work from each person, increasing morale and team spirit, reducing food waste in preparation and storage, reducing water and electricity use, and finding new ways to improve customer service. While some of these are simply speed-up and some also indicated pay rises may be more limited, most were forms of productivity improvement either directly or through improved management including building employee skills and involvement. Contrary to some assertions, very few managers said they would reduce training, reduce the number of people on the payroll or hire more teenage workers. The payroll records showed a lower worker attrition rate over the 2007-2009 period. Employees strongly supported the wage rises (91 percent in favour) while showing clear evidence of understanding the mechanisms that would be used to offset the higher costs.
- 6.6. Managers also reduced profit margins and increased prices, though this was limited by competition. Wage compression and lower turnover rates also reduced costs. Despite mandates from owners to keep labour costs below a fixed percentage of sales value, managers found other ways to cope rather than reduce hours or lay employees off. In other words, the wage pressures induced productivity gains that would otherwise not have been sought.
- 6.7. Rizov and Croucher<sup>54</sup> examined the longitudinal impact of the UK national minimum wage on firm productivity. They found that the aggregate low-paying sector productivity had been significantly positively affected by the NMW over a ten year period though the magnitude varied by sector and firm size, with productivity increases being more marked in larger firms
- 6.8. McLaughlin<sup>55</sup> compares Denmark to New Zealand and argues that raising the minimum wage will “shock” firms into raising productivity if there are strong incentives and pressures for them to do so. Using the Danish experience, he suggests a coordinated approach incorporating employers,

<sup>54</sup> “The impact of the UK national minimum wage on productivity by low-paying sectors and firm-size groups”. By M. Rizov, and R. Croucher, 2011. Report to the Low Pay Commission.

<sup>55</sup> “The Productivity-Enhancing Impacts of the Minimum Wage: Lessons from Denmark and New Zealand”, Colm McLaughlin, *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 47:2 June 2009, pp. 327–348.

government supported institutions including funding for training, and an active union movement with legislatively supported industry bargaining mechanisms. These should work together to support investment in skills and training which are an essential contributor to enhancing productivity. “The coordination mechanisms between employers and unions at various levels of the economy play a pivotal role in ensuring that the funding is used effectively through an on-going process of developing, implementing and reviewing training programmes”, he writes.

- 6.9. The idea that raising the minimum wage can drive productivity improvements is given additional support in a U.K. study which found that “with notable exceptions, aggregate LPC (low-paying) sector productivity has been significantly positively affected by the National Minimum Wage (NMW) over a ten year period as the effects’ magnitudes vary by sector. In most of the sectors the impact is statistically significant and positive with the exception of hairdressing, leisure and agriculture where the impact is not statistically significant even though positive.<sup>56</sup>
- 6.10. Compared with Australia, the relative price of labour to capital in New Zealand has fallen dramatically. In a 2003 Treasury paper, Hall and Scobie found that from being equivalent with Australia in the 1980s, the relative cost of labour to capital in New Zealand had fallen by 60 per cent.<sup>57</sup> The paper notes that, “with labour relatively cheaper in relation to capital than in Australia, it appears that New Zealand firms have opted for a lower level of capital intensity”.
- 6.11. Other research has shown the same outcome: that the low wage structure led to reliance by business on low wages rather than increases in productivity through investment. For example, Deardorff and Lattimore found in 1999 that:<sup>58</sup>

By 1986, the importable sector supported by trade barriers, was both more capital intensive than the exportable sector and more intensive in all categories of higher labour skills than exportables... This group had nearly halved by 1996 as the tradeable sector shed labour during the early phases of the economic reforms. ... The traded goods sector is not intensive in the use of employees, of either sex, with degrees or advanced tertiary training.

<sup>56</sup> “The impact of the UK national minimum wage on productivity by low-paying sectors and firm-size groups”. By M. Rizov, and R. Croucher, 2011. Report to the Low Pay Commission.

<sup>57</sup> “Capital Shallowness: A Problem for New Zealand?”, by Julia Hall and Grant Scobie, NZ Treasury Working Paper 05/05, June 2005

<sup>58</sup> “Trade and Factor-Market Effects of New Zealand's Reforms”, by Alan Deardorff and Ralph Lattimore, New Zealand Economic Papers, June 1999 v33 i1 p71.

- 6.12. By 2002, capital intensity in Australia was more than 50 per cent higher than New Zealand. From this Hall and Scobie find that between 1995 and 2002, 70 per cent of the difference in the growth of labour productivity in New Zealand is explained by a lower growth rate in capital intensity.
- 6.13. The International Monetary Fund<sup>59</sup> has estimated that in 1999 average labour productivity in market sectors in New Zealand was only 73% of the Australian level, down from 82% in 1988. So productivity in relation to Australia was higher when there was the award system for wages in New Zealand.
- 6.14. A study by NZIER<sup>60</sup> suggested the emphasis on capital intensity was overplayed and that there should be more focus on multifactor productivity characteristics such as skills of workers and management. Industry-specific factors were also important.
- 6.15. In terms of productivity, these studies clearly show that the problem in New Zealand is not a lack of labour market flexibility or that wages are too high. The problem is that wages are far too low and that firms are investing in more workers and poor workplace practices rather than more capital-intensive use of labour.
- 6.16. The evidence in New Zealand points to low wages having a negative impact on productivity. Low pay discourages investment in capital and skills, and locks many New Zealand firms into low targets for efficiency and harms economic transformation.
- 6.17. Workers are also discouraged from raising their skill levels, particularly in industry-related skills. In 9.6 we quote evidence of low, zero or negative recognition in pay levels of attaining industry qualifications.
- 6.18. In addition, the growing pressure for increased temporary migration in the New Zealand economy, and the downward pressure this creates on wages, only underlines many employers' blinkered view of labour productivity.
- 6.19. In its own right, low pay worsens the performance of labour. Low pay is commonly associated with high levels of labour market churn. For instance, an Auckland University survey undertaken on behalf of a Ministry of Health Quality and Safety project showed that average pay of \$10.80 per hour correlated with staff turnover of 30-40 per cent each year.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> "New Zealand: Selected Issues", International Monetary Fund, 2002, IMF Country Report No 02/72, prepared by K Kochhar, M Cerisola, R Cardarelli and K Ueda, Washington.

<sup>60</sup> "Industry Productivity and the Australia-New Zealand income gap", by Qing Yang and John Stephenson, NZIER, September 2011.

<sup>61</sup> "Disability Support Services in New Zealand: The Workforce Survey – Final Report", Ministry of Health, August 2004.

- 6.20. The following was reported in the CTU publication *Under Pressure*<sup>62</sup>. In any one year, the number of wage and salary workers leaving a job is almost two-thirds of the number of existing jobs. In good times more than that number find a new job; in bad times some do not. However this does not mean that two-thirds of workers are changing their jobs every year because some change jobs more than once in a year – but it does mean that there are many workers whose working life is in constant flux.
- 6.21. In the year to June 2012, for example, Statistics New Zealand's linked employer-employee data (LEED) series recorded 1.089 million 'worker separations' looking only at jobs that had changed between the four quarters of that year. Many shorter lived jobs may not have been counted (on the other hand, the count included moves between geographical locations within one employer – not true 'separations'). There were an average of 1.812 million filled jobs over that year and 1.115 million 'worker accessions' – employees starting a job. In such a job market, it should not be surprising that many jobs are insecure, short-lived and temporary.
- 6.22. One way this shows itself is in the average length of time jobs are held by New Zealand workers. Job tenure in New Zealand is among the shortest in the OECD. According to Statistics New Zealand's Survey of Working Life (SoWL) for the year ended December 2012 and similar surveys in OECD countries, almost twice the proportion of people have been less than a year in their job in New Zealand compared to the Netherlands. Only Denmark, Australia, Mexico, Turkey and Korea have a greater proportion of people in jobs for less than a year. Not far below are Canada, Finland, Iceland and the US. Though countries like Denmark and Finland have proportions in short tenure jobs comparable to New Zealand, they have a much greater proportion in jobs with tenure of 10 years and over – 27 percent and 38 percent compared to New Zealand's 22 percent. New Zealand has the third-smallest proportion of workers in jobs with tenure of 10 years and over.
- 6.23. The countries below New Zealand illustrate two extremes of an insecure job market. Mexico, Turkey, and the US, for example, have poor social support for those losing their jobs. The consequences in loss of income and future opportunities unless another job is quickly found can be immense: in the US it is the second most frequent cause of bankruptcy (after medical expenses).
- 6.24. An alternative source of data on job tenure in New Zealand is Statistics New Zealand's LEED series. It shows an even more extreme concentration of New Zealand employees with short tenures. For the year ended 31 March 2011, for example, it estimated 38.7 percent of employees were in their first year of a job, and only 7.9 percent had over 10 years of service – compared to the 2012 SoWL which showed 19.9 percent in their first year and 21.5 percent with over 10 years of tenure. There are methodological differences

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<sup>62</sup> "Under Pressure: A Detailed Report into Insecure Work in New Zealand", New Zealand Council of Trade Unions Te Kauae Kaimahi, October 2013, p.12-13, available at <http://union.org.nz/underpressure>.

that explain some of the disparity, but it lends further weight to the evidence of short job tenure in New Zealand.

- 6.25. In contrast, while levels of benefits have often fallen since the global financial crisis, countries like Denmark and Finland still provide strong support to those losing their jobs with active labour market policies that provide high rates of income replacement along with support (and pressure) for training and finding a new job, recognising that the cost is one that should be born predominantly by society rather than the individual. New Zealanders does not have a similarly generous welfare system: OECD comparisons show that New Zealand has one of the least generous income replacement rates for unemployed people in their early stages of unemployment – between 20th and last out of 33 countries depending on family circumstances.<sup>63</sup> The consequences of job loss in New Zealand fall heavily on individuals and their families. Denmark and Finland are arguably getting the benefits of both flexibility and productivity while retaining a higher degree of employment security.
- 6.26. Short job tenure has an economic cost. Earnings rise with length of time on the job. The 2012 SoWL showed that average weekly earnings for someone in the second six months of a job were \$854. For someone over 15 years in the job it was \$1,295 – half as much again. LEED data shows similar patterns. Shorter tenure is likely to mean lower earnings. But in addition, those higher earnings reflect higher productivity for the employer. Loss of skills, experience, firm-specific knowledge and the higher productivity that goes with them are a cost to the economy.
- 6.27. While a certain level of labour turnover is indicative of a dynamic labour market, the high level of churn among New Zealand jobs must be impacting negatively on firm performance and overall labour productivity.

## **7. Raising the Minimum Wage does not increase unemployment**

- 7.1. A 96 per cent increase in the adult minimum wage and (apart from the effect of the reinstatement of the youth wage through the so-called ‘Starting Out’ wage) more than tripling of wages for 15-19 year olds since 1999 has not been a disincentive for employers to take on new staff. The adult minimum has risen 23 percent faster than the average hourly wage and youth wages rose twice as fast (Starting Out wage aside). There have been considerable periods during this time where rising labour force participation and falling unemployment demonstrated workers were not being priced out of the labour market and the tired old argument that an increase in the minimum wage must mean an increase in unemployment is now discredited.

<sup>63</sup> OECD (2013). Benefits and Wages: Statistics. Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs - OECD. Retrieved September 12, 2013, from <http://www.oecd.org/els/benefitsandwagesstatistics.htm>

- 7.2. Increases in the minimum wage will have some impact on employment, but there is increasing evidence that these effects are at worst small, and frequently do not exist. We come back to this below.
- 7.3. In addition, we have provided evidence above that wages have not risen nearly as fast as productivity. A recent study<sup>64</sup> throws further doubt on the connection between wages and productivity from a different direction. It analysed the revenue and wages in 1,735 representative medium to large Belgian firms over a six year period finding no significant differences in the productivity of different occupational groups within the firms, despite obvious differences in pay.
- 7.4. These findings suggest that assumptions of perfectly competitive labour and goods markets are wrong, that there is room in company revenues for higher wages, and that much more sophisticated models incorporating bargaining power (including employer monopsony power), market dominance in product markets, the effect of wage rises in stimulating demand and productivity improvements, and the findings of empirical studies in the US, are needed to accurately anticipate the effects of changes in the minimum wage.
- 7.5. In particular, we are unconvinced by the model used by the MBIE to forecast the employment outcomes of a rise in the minimum wage. These routinely predict employment losses contrary to many empirical findings. The 2012 NZIER review of the former Department of Labour's modelling<sup>65</sup> largely failed to survey or take into account recent literature on the minimum wage and employment surveyed here such as that by Dube, Allegretto, Reich and Lester, and Addison, Blackburn and Cotti. Dube in particular has made (and continues to make) significant contributions regarding methodology. MBIE should be discarding its modelling based on inadequate neo-classical theories which have failed to be validated empirically and should be adopting a more open approach.
- 7.6. The shifting international views on the employment effects of the minimum wage are exemplified by recent articles in the long-time opponent of the minimum wage, the *Economist* magazine. A recent *Economist* blog for example acknowledged that

In sum, the employment effects we'd expect if labour-markets were perfectly competitive don't emerge. That's because there is some monopsony power to labour markets, associated with frictions like the cost of searching for new jobs. Those frictions give employers a bargaining-power advantage that a minimum wage can in some cases counteract. Further, minimum wage

<sup>64</sup> "Are Occupations Paid What They Are Worth? An Econometric Study of Occupational Wage Inequality and Productivity", by Stephan Kampelman and François Rycx, IZA Discussion paper no. 5951, September 2011, Forchungsinsitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/Institute for the Study of Labour.

<sup>65</sup> Zeng, L., & Yang, Q. (2012). Model review: Department of Labour's in-house minimum-wage model. Wellington, New Zealand: NZIER.

increases may give both workers and employers an incentive to raise their productivity levels in order to preserve jobs: people work harder to justify the higher wage.<sup>66</sup>

- 7.7. It also pointed to a recent poll of expert US researchers in the field who were evenly split on the assertion that raising the federal minimum wage to US\$9 per hour would make it noticeably harder for low-skilled workers to find employment with 60 percent uncertain or disagreeing (weighted by the experts' confidence). This is a significant change from polls a decade or more ago which showed a large majority of economists being of the view that minimum wages reduced employment. The same poll showed strong agreement with the proposition that "The distortionary costs of raising the federal minimum wage to \$9 per hour and indexing it to inflation are sufficiently small compared with the benefits to low-skilled workers who can find employment that this would be a desirable policy." Weighted by confidence, 62 percent agreed, and 23 percent were uncertain with only 16 percent disagreeing.<sup>67</sup>
- 7.8. There are useful theoretical discussions contained in the papers already cited by Herr, Kazandziska and Mahnkopf-Praprotnik,<sup>68</sup> and Zelenska.<sup>69</sup>
- 7.9. From both an employment and productivity perspective, there are good grounds for a substantial increase beyond the current \$13.75 an hour.
- 7.10. There are now numerous studies concluding "no significant impact" on employment (let alone unemployment) of increases in the minimum wage. These findings do not mean there will be no impact under any circumstances but improvements in statistical methodology and greater understanding of the factors connecting wages and employment tend to cast doubt on negative effects that are found. A more complete assessment of the literature in relation to the impact of minimum wage increases is set out in Appendix 1, but the following provides a summary of some of the most recent research.
- 7.11. Economist Arindrajit Dube, along with colleagues William Lester, Sylvia Allegretto and Michael Reich, have conducted several studies based on the

<sup>66</sup> "Minimum human wages", 15 February 2013, at <http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/02/labour-markets>.

<sup>67</sup> "Minimum Wage", IGM Forum, 26 February 2013, available at [http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel/poll-results?SurveyID=SV\\_br0IEq5a9E77NMV](http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel/poll-results?SurveyID=SV_br0IEq5a9E77NMV).

<sup>68</sup> "The Theoretical Debate about Minimum Wages", by Hansjörg Herr, Mika Kazandziska and Silke Mahnkopf-Praprotnik, Working Paper No. 6, Global Labour University Working Papers. Berlin: Global Labour University, p.24. Retrieved from [http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed\\_dialogue/---actrav/documents/publication/wcms\\_115075.pdf](http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---actrav/documents/publication/wcms_115075.pdf)

<sup>69</sup> "Channels of Adjustment in Labor Markets: The 2007-2009 Federal Minimum Wage Increase", by Tetyana Zelenska, 2011, Economics Dissertations, Georgia State University, Paper 70, [http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/econ\\_diss/70](http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/econ_diss/70).

fact that many States in the US have their own minimum wages at a level above the Federal minimum. By comparing firms operating in counties on either sides of borders of States with different minimum wages they have been able to isolate employment effects of minimum wage increases, and consistently find no significant effect on employment.

- 7.12. Dube recently summarised the state of minimum wage research.<sup>70</sup> He described one of his key studies (with Lester and Reich):<sup>71</sup> They compared contiguous counties across state borders, over 64 different border segments with minimum wage differences over a 17-year period (1990-2006). Employment effects were positive rather than negative but not statistically significant, even over the long run. Given the long period it covered, it spanned several recessions, and subsequent analysis by one of the co-authors finds that “the overall results hold when only recession periods are considered.”<sup>72</sup> Another study looked at the effects on teenage employment, again finding no employment effect, and again that held over recession periods.<sup>73</sup>
- 7.13. Dube notes that “the most common [research approach] since the 1990s has been the ‘state panel’ approach pioneered by David Neumark and William Wascher. Like the individual case study, it uses only differences in minimum wages across states to form inference. However, instead of comparing two areas that may be similar based on, say, proximity, the ‘state panel’ studies effectively compare all states to all states, while accounting for possible differences by including statistical controls. The state panel approach has tended to find negative effects, especially when considering a high impact demographic group such as teenagers... However, it also assumes that we can find enough control variables to include in our regression that will make Texas look like Massachusetts. As it turns out, this is a heroic assumption that badly biases the results.” Dube cites several studies carried out with his colleagues showing “the nature of bias in the state panel studies. The kind of states that have tended to have higher minimum wage in the past 20 years have been quite different from those who have tended to have lower minimum wages.”

<sup>70</sup> “Minimum Wage Laws and the Labor Market: What Have We Learned Since Card and Krueger’s Book Myth and Measurement?”, Arindrajit Dube, 1 September 2011, <http://www.newdeal20.org/2011/09/01/minimum-wage-laws-and-the-labor-market-what-have-we-learned-since-card-and-kruegers-book-myth-and-measurement-57160/>.

<sup>71</sup> “Minimum Wage Effects Across State Borders: Estimates Using Contiguous Counties”, by Arindrajit Dube, T. William Lester, and Michael Reich, *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, November 2010, 92(4): 945–964.

<sup>72</sup> “An Increased Minimum Wage Is Good Policy Even During Hard Times”, by T. William Lester, David Madland, and Nick Bunker, 7 June, 2011, available at [http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2011/06/higher\\_minimum\\_wage.html](http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2011/06/higher_minimum_wage.html).

<sup>73</sup> “Do Minimum Wages Really Reduce Teen Employment? Accounting for Heterogeneity and Selectivity in State Panel Data”, by A. Allegretto, A. Dube and M. Reich, *Industrial Relations*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (April 2011). Also available at <http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/7jq2q3j8>.

- 7.14. In other words, there is a very strong regional component to the minimum wage variation. This can lead to very misleading inference if we compare teen employment growth in, say, Texas and Massachusetts. Given factors such as climate, proximity to Mexico, and others that are usually not fully accounted for in state panel approaches, we might expect very different trends in employment in those states quite apart from minimum wages. Similarly, the growth rate in low-wage jobs has been quite different in states like Texas, North Dakota, and Indiana even though these states have had the same binding minimum wage (i.e., the federal) over the past two decades. Unless one controls for the ‘unobserved’ (or more accurately ‘not directly observed’) sources of heterogeneity in the growth prospects across areas, conclusions may be badly flawed.
- 7.15. It appears then that the closer a study can control dynamically for the specific characteristics of different labour markets that occur within the country, usually defined by locality (such as state or county in the US), and in some cases additionally an employment subsector, the less likely it is to find negative employment effects. This includes differences such as in business cycles, seasonality, and wage, age and sectoral patterns. It may not be enough to control by using fixed effects models (where the differences between localities are assumed to be the same throughout the period of study). Or put the other way, studies that fail to control properly for these local differences may spuriously detect negative employment effects.
- 7.16. Dube considers these findings provide evidence for models of the labour market in which employers have monopsony power (the power to set wages or conditions due to job shortages and reluctance or inability of employees to move jobs, giving the employer the position of monopoly provider of employment for its employees – like the “inherent inequality of power in employment relationships” recognised in the object section of the ERA). Such models are gathering support, with one of the earlier developers, Dale Mortensen, receiving the Nobel Memorial prize in Economics along with two others for their analysis of markets with similar characteristics (search frictions), and growing empirical evidence.
- 7.17. John T. Addison, McKinley L. Blackburn, and Chad D. Cotti have made similar findings to Dube and his colleagues, covering the US retail trade sector,<sup>74</sup> the effect of the current recession,<sup>75</sup> and a re-examination of the restaurant-and-bar sector.<sup>76</sup> The first of these studies found employment

<sup>74</sup> “Do Minimum Wages Raise Employment? Evidence from the U.S. Retail-Trade Sector”, John T. Addison, McKinley L. Blackburn, and Chad D. Cotti, 2009. *Labour Economics*, vol. 16(4), pages 397-408, August.

<sup>75</sup> “Minimum Wage Increases in a Soft U.S. Economy”, John T. Addison, McKinley L. Blackburn, and Chad D. Cotti, 2011, Institute for Advanced Studies. Available at <http://ideas.repec.org/p/ihs/ihsesp/273.html>.

<sup>76</sup> “The Effect of Minimum Wages on Labor Market Outcomes: County-Level Estimates from the Restaurant-and-Bar Sector”, John T. Addison, McKinley L. Blackburn, and Chad D. Cotti, 2011, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis. Available at: <http://ideas.repec.org/p/rim/rimwps/02-08.html>.

effects were eliminated by controlling quite coarsely for locality using Census division in the US, of which there are only nine.

- 7.18. An international review of minimum wage studies of the impact of minimum wages on the youth labour market organised by the U.K. Low Pay Commission, was published in March 2011.<sup>77</sup> It covered 12 countries and concluded that “The size of employment effects from the introduction of or increases in minimum wages for young people in general are extremely small and on the margins of statistical significance in the great majority of studies surveyed”. While “the impact of minimum wages upon the youth labour market is more likely to be negative where there is no separate subminimum (minima) for younger workers as for example in Spain”, it also concluded that “the method by which the minimum wage is set is relevant, with systems which set rates by collective bargaining less likely to experience negative employment effects.”
- 7.19. In relation to New Zealand it concluded that “The literature indicates the following conclusions. There were no or very small effects of the minimum wage on employment for the 20-24 age group. There were varied findings on the impact of rises in the minimum wage on employment for younger age groups, with estimates ranging from ‘non-robust’, to zero or fairly weak negative effects (Chapple, Hyslop and Stillman). The employment elasticity for 16-17 year-olds in 2003 in Hyslop and Stillman (2007) was -0.1 to -0.2: this is consistent with other literature.”
- 7.20. A study of minimum wage changes in Australia found that “the introduction of minimum wage legislation in Australia in 1997 and subsequent minimum wage increases appear not to have had any significant negative employment effects for teenagers.”<sup>78</sup>
- 7.21. The 2011 study by Hyslop and Stillman<sup>79</sup> commissioned by the Department of Labour considered the effects of the very sharp increase in minimum wage that occurred in April 2008 for 16 and 17 year olds here in New Zealand.
- 7.22. It shows that the employment rate among non-students increased by about 3 percentage points. While it concludes that the change lowered employment for the age group overall by 3-6 percentage points in the two years following

<sup>77</sup> “The impact of Minimum Wages on the Youth Labour Market, an International Literature Review for the Low Pay Commission”, by Richard Croucher and Geoff White, March 2011.

<sup>78</sup> “Minimum Wages and Employment: Reconsidering the Use of a Time Series Approach as an Evaluation Tool”, by W.-S. Lee and S. Suardi, 2011. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 49, p.s376–s401.

<sup>79</sup> “The Impact of the 2008 Youth Minimum Wage Reform”, by Dean Hyslop, and Steven Stillman, 2011., Wellington, New Zealand: Department of Labour. Available at: <http://www.dol.govt.nz/publications/research/impact-2008-youth-minimum-wage-reform/exec-summary.asp>.

the change, with no significant effect in the first year, the loss of employment was largely borne by 16-17 year old students, to some extent to the benefit of 18-19 year old students.

- 7.23. However there was no increase in the rate of 16-17 year old unemployment as a result of the changes. The loss of employment was more than offset by an increase in those studying and not working. Indeed, there was a reduction in the rate of inactivity among 16-17 year olds (not in employment, education or training).
- 7.24. Under some assumptions, average hours worked by 16-17 and 18-19 year-olds fell after 2008, as did their earnings and total incomes. The changes in main-job earnings for 16-17 year olds were a fall of around 15 percent in 2009 and a rise of around 10 percent in 2010; and a fall of 5-10 percent for total earnings. For 18-19 year olds the main-job earnings fell 10-15 percent in 2009 and 2010.
- 7.25. However under other assumptions, the falls in earnings and hours worked were smaller, some even showed increases in earnings or hours, and some were not statistically significant. The negative findings were not robust to all specifications. While the analysis implicitly controls for the recession by its methodology of comparing 17-18 year olds with 20-21 year olds, where further controls were added for the business cycle, some of the negative effects became weaker (e.g. loss of hours worked) or even disappeared (e.g. loss of earnings).
- 7.26. It is possible that the control for the business cycle using aggregate adult unemployment may not be appropriate given that employment of teenagers is highly concentrated in the Retail Trade and Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants sectors. The effect of the global recession was significantly greater in those sectors than the average effect for the economy as a whole. That is, the control in their models may underestimate the global recession effect, thus inflating the negative effects (if any) of the 2008 minimum wage changes.
- 7.27. Given that 18-19 year olds were not directly affected by the change in minimum wage – if anything they might have been expected to benefit from being preferred to the younger workers as they apparently did with employment – it is not clear that their loss of hours and earnings was due to the minimum wage change. There could have been a “teen effect” such as for example the sector effects mentioned in the previous paragraph, or employers favouring older workers when reducing hours or taking on new employees during the recession whose beginning coincided with the change to the minimum wage.
- 7.28. It is also possible that the experimental design has not sufficiently taken into account Dube’s findings on the importance of locality. Given that there are significant regional variations in employment in New Zealand, such as urban / rural differences, seasonality, age and skill levels of the labour force, sectoral composition and differences in unemployment levels this may be a

significant factor here too. Unemployment in the South Island (at least prior to the earthquakes, as in this study) was low even at the height of unemployment nationally. Most of the rise in unemployment has been in the north and east of the North Island.

- 7.29. The changes appear to have encouraged more 16-17 year olds to continue in education which is a positive long term outcome for that age group. While a loss of employment, hours and income (if it occurred) was unfortunate for the 16-19 year old students, many, including the CTU, have long argued that teenagers should be in education and training rather than encouraged into work.
- 7.30. Those not studying have not been badly affected, though they may have lost income at least in the short run.
- 7.31. Given the very large increase in the 16-17 year old minimum wage – 28 percent in real terms, and affecting most 16-17 year olds in work (60-70 percent were below the adult minimum in 2007), these findings are very consistent with the usual findings of no, or small employment impacts of minimum wage changes. It implies that going back to youth rates is unlikely to reduce rates of either unemployment or inactivity (not in employment, education or training).
- 7.32. However large changes do need to be undertaken with care, and it would be wise to accompany them with supportive active labour market policies. The importance of collective bargaining highlighted in the U.K. Low Pay Commission study should be acknowledged through legislation to strengthen it. Such changes are much easier in an environment of high employment so the Government should focus much more on stimulating the economy to lower unemployment for all age groups, and should be taking much more action to actively engage workers in training and other productivity improvements. Young people should be encouraged to continue their education by raising the caps on tertiary education places and putting a high priority on changes that will encourage school leavers into industry training.
- 7.33. Hyslop and Stillman found in 2004 that a 69 per cent increase in the minimum wage for 18 and 19-year-olds in 2001 and a 41 per cent increase in the minimum wage for 16 and 17-year-olds over a two year period had no adverse effects on youth employment or hours worked.<sup>80</sup> In fact, hours of work increased for 16 and 17-year-olds relative to other age groups.

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<sup>80</sup> “Youth Minimum Wage Reform and the Labour Market” by Dean Hyslop and Steven Stillman, NZ Treasury Working Paper 04/03, March 2004.

## 8. Starting-Out Wage

- 8.1. The CTU opposed the introduction of the starting-out wage and calls for its repeal. It is unfair and discriminatory to pay lower wages to a worker performing the same work as another worker on the basis of age.
- 8.2. Paying lower wages to one group of workers, based solely on their age, is contrary to the principle of non-discrimination in employment. ILO Convention No. 111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) (C111) is one of the core ILO conventions and outlaws unequal payment for work of equal value.
- 8.3. There is no evidence to support the position that the work carried out by younger and new workers is inherently of a lesser value than the work done by older workers. To the contrary, Tipper finds in an industry-level study of New Zealand’s workforce that there is “no relationship between workforce age structure and labour productivity”, and in fact that “younger workers are paid less than their productivity would warrant.”<sup>81</sup>
- 8.4. There is also no strong evidence to support the theory that a youth minimum wage will increase the employment of 16 and 17 year olds – the argument used by those who support the reintroduction of youth rates.
- 8.5. Such modelling of the impact of the starting-out wage as has been done suggests that even if the highly optimistic assumptions that underpin the estimates come to pass, the net impact on the youth labour market will be small, perhaps in the range of 1-2 percent increase in aggregate, but involve considerable job loss in the 18-19 year old age group.<sup>82</sup>
- 8.6. The CTU agrees that New Zealand has a youth employment crisis and that there is an urgent need to reduce youth unemployment. However the starting-out wage offers no solution to this complex problem. The CTU supports the specific recommendations of the New Zealand Institute in their paper ‘More Ladders, Fewer Snakes’<sup>83</sup> for better transitions of young people between education and employment and more investment in education and training.
- 8.7. The CTU policy for the removal of the starting-out wage is supported by Hyslop and Stillman’s 2011 findings quoted above showing that the rise in

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<sup>81</sup> “Labour productivity, real wages, and workforce age structure”, by A. Tipper, Statistics New Zealand, Paper presented at the 53rd New Zealand Association of Economists conference, at Palmerston North, New Zealand, 28 June 2012.

<sup>82</sup> Impacts of the Starting Out Wage. (2012). Ministry of Business Innovation & Employment: Labour Group, Retrieved November 6, 2012, from <http://www.dol.govt.nz/er/pay/starting-out-wage/sow-employment-impacts-advice.pdf>

<sup>83</sup> “More ladders, Fewer snakes: Two Proposals to reduce youth disadvantage”, by R. Bowen, C. Harland, and L. Grace, The New Zealand Institute, July 2011.

youth unemployment over the last three years cannot be attributed to the removal of youth rates in 2008.<sup>84</sup>

- 8.8. In addition, their study “found that the introduction of the New Entrants minimum wage was largely ignored by businesses and that most 16 and 17 year old workers were moved on to the adult minimum wage”.
- 8.9. There would seem little evidence to suggest that the starting-out wage will be any more successful in reducing youth unemployment. Employers have clearly indicated that they are more concerned with hiring people with desirable attributes than anything else.<sup>85</sup>
- 8.10. In addition many employers interviewed in recent MBIE research indicated that they would not use sub-minimum rates as they felt that these rates were both fundamentally unjust and would inhibit their ability to attract high-quality applicants.<sup>86</sup>
- 8.11. The argument that 16 and 17 year olds entering the workforce do not have work skills or employment experience and need more supervision and training than workers aged over 17 perpetuates stereotypes about the capabilities of young people. It also ignores the fact that many young people have had prior work experience and have been in the workforce for a considerable period before they turn 16..
- 8.12. Proponents of youth rates say that young workers need orientation and training when they start a new job. But that same logic applies to anyone who starts a new job. There is no evidence that young workers need more training and take longer to orient into work. The reverse is likely to be true in many cases.
- 8.13. The CTU conditionally supports a trainee wage recognising that there is an additional employment cost for employers supporting employees to undertake training on the National Qualification Framework. This is covered in more detail below.
- 8.14. A major issue for the Government and certainly a long standing concern for the CTU is the absence of a minimum wage for those aged under 16 years of age. Workers under 16 years of age can be paid wage rates lower than those received by other workers, and there is no redress or any protections limiting how low these rates can fall.

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<sup>84</sup> “The impact of the 2008 youth minimum wage reform”, by D. Hyslop, and S. Stillman, August 2011.

<sup>85</sup> Employers’ Perspectives -Part Two: The Minimum Wage System. (2012).Ministry of Business Innovation & Employment: Labour Group. Retrieved November 4, 2012, from <http://dol.govt.nz/publications/research/employers-perspectives-part2-minimum-wage/employers-perspectives-part2-minimum-wage.pdf>

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

- 8.15. Research by Caritas in 2003<sup>87</sup> and 2006<sup>88</sup> found that that there is inadequate attention given to the working experiences of New Zealand children. They showed that children working in delivery work are exposed to significant health and safety hazards and experience injuries as a result.
- 8.16. It was a revelation to many Parliamentarians at the time of the Abolition of Age Discrimination Bill that there is no minimum wage level for young people under the age of 16 years or general age limit for employment. This is in breach one of the four international labour standards - ILO Convention No. 138 Minimum Age Convention (C138)..
- 8.17. The CTU again submits that there should be an approach to the ILO to assist us to review our labour and education laws and policy in order to ratify C138 and to provide a threshold for the entry of young people into work which must include the setting of minimum wage levels for young people under 16 years old.

## 9. Training Rates

- 9.1. The CTU supports an exemption for trainees on a conditional basis. The conditions are:
- That wage rates are negotiated on a scale which sees the rate progressively increase to at least the minimum wage;
  - That the training requires 60 credits a year on a programme on the National Qualifications Framework;
  - The maximum length of time that a trainee can remain on a rate lower than the adult minimum wage rate is 12 months; and
  - There must be oversight to ensure that a significant training component exists in the job and that trainees are getting access to quality training.
- 9.2. Changes introduced by the Minimum Wage (Starting-Out Wage) Amendment Act 2013 mean that 16-19 year olds required to undertake 40 credits or more of training under the National Qualifications Framework as part of their employment agreement may be paid the Starting-Out Wage until they turn 20. These changes mean that the training rate for under-20s meets none of our criteria for support and we recommend that this rate is repealed along with other youth subminimum rates.
- 9.3. The adult training rate is slightly better in that it requires sixty credits in a recognised training programme under the National Qualifications Framework. However it fails to meet our other conditions for support.

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<sup>87</sup> “Protecting Children at Work: Children’s Work Survey”, Caritas Aotearoa New Zealand, Wellington 2003.

<sup>88</sup> “Delivering the Goods, A survey of Child Delivery Workers”, Caritas Aotearoa New Zealand, 2006.

- 9.4. If these conditions are not introduced then we submit that the trainee rate should be abolished. These are safeguards to ensure that the trade-off between provision of such training and exemption from the minimum wage is not being exploited.
- 9.5. However it is with some reservation that we support trainee rates even subject to the above conditions. While we recognise the additional costs of training to the employer and accept the case for some compensation for training costs incurred by an employer to fully support a trainee, there must be strict supervision to ensure the training and support occurs.
- 9.6. A reason given for trainee rates is that workers will acquire higher wages following training and qualification achievement. But this is only true at higher qualification levels such as degrees. Employers frequently do not recognise industry training qualifications and subsequent experience on the job sufficiently in better wages. For example a 2009 study of the earnings effect of workplace-based industry training by Statistics New Zealand and the then Department of Labour<sup>89</sup> showed that 15–19 year old males experienced an annualised increase in average monthly earnings of just 11.3 percent as a result of undertaking and obtaining a Level 4 qualification, 3.6 percent for a Level 3 qualification, and no increase for lower levels. Even worse, 15–19 year old females benefited by just 6.8 percent from a Level 4 qualification, 9.7 percent for a Level 3 qualification, and no increase for lower levels. The increases were even less for older participants (for example 5.4 percent for male 20-24 year olds, 1.1 percent for female 20-24 year olds, and negative for 25-29 year old females completing a Level 4 qualification), and the study warned that the results for 15-19 year olds were overestimated. The position is even worse for further education by existing workers making the effort to increase their skills. For some, their pay actually falls after attaining a qualification, and most see at best small increases in their pay.<sup>90</sup>
- 9.7. Treasury has also found that private returns to tertiary education in New Zealand are near the bottom of the OECD.<sup>91</sup>
- 9.8. Trainees are faced with very low income while they are training, with little reward once they complete their qualification. There is little incentive on young workers to make the effort to gain these qualifications – or to take a

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<sup>89</sup> “Does Workplace-based Industry Training Improve Earnings?”, by Sarah Crichton, Statistics New Zealand and New Zealand Department of Labour, September 2009. Available at <http://www.dol.govt.nz/publication-view.asp?ID=318>.

<sup>90</sup> “Labour Market Returns to Further Education for Working Adults”, by Sarah Crichton and Sylvia Dixon, Department of Labour, 2011, available at <http://www.dol.govt.nz/publication-view.asp?ID=380>.

<sup>91</sup> Zuccollo, J., Maani, S., Kaye-Blake, B., & Lulu Zeng. (2013). Private Returns to Tertiary Education - How Does New Zealand Compare to the OECD? (Working Paper No. WP 13/10) (p. 53). Wellington, New Zealand: The Treasury. Retrieved from <http://purl.oclc.org/nzt/p-1568>

vocational training pathway in the first place – when rewards are so poor. Under these conditions, trainee rates are a barrier to skill development. Pay recognition for qualifications gained and for skills developed on the job should be a condition of subsidising industry trainees taken on by employers. Unions should be encouraged to take an active role in supporting this, including collective bargaining coverage for trainees.

- 9.9. The need for more focus on training and vocational support in the workplace is undisputed. But the quality and access to training can vary enormously. Therefore the CTU recommends a more robust process to ensure oversight of the conditions allowing a trainee rate.
- 9.10. Given that trainee rates could extend to young workers on the starting-out wage or in the Youth Guarantee Scheme, if this scheme is expanded it is even more necessary to ensure overview of the trainee rate and ensure that the conditions are being met.
- 9.11. Apprenticeships, trades training and industry training are all ways to increase the skill levels of workers in employment. But lower wage rates for trainees should not mean that trainees get unsustainable wages. This will not assist in increasing the appeal of trades training and apprenticeships, which is much needed.
- 9.12. Trainees require adequate wages to meet reasonable costs of living and some need to support families. Very low wages will only serve to increase the dropout rate of trainees. Payment of a fair wage will increase the chance of completion of industry training courses or apprenticeships and increase the likelihood of an employer having a trained worker at the end of the training period.
- 9.13. Apprenticeship wage rates in the past were on a graduated scale recognising that following the completion of an apprenticeship a higher rate of pay would compensate for the lower initial starting rate. But this is not the case for women who have completed apprenticeships.
- 9.14. A 2006 study commissioned by the Ministry of Women's Affairs showed that despite similar starting rates, once employees in a male-dominated occupation had completed their apprenticeships their wages jumped up considerably (to \$19 an hour when the minimum wage was \$10.25), whereas the rates for females in female-dominated occupations stayed close to minimum wage levels.
- 9.15. Regrettably the Modern Apprenticeship Scheme continues to preserve inequities in relation to gender, ethnicity and people with disabilities.
- 9.16. We propose again that MBIE undertakes research on the extent to which training rates are used and the quality of the training received while they are paid less than the full adult minimum wage.

## **10. Labour participation rates and social policy**

- 10.1. An increase in minimum wages will have a beneficial impact on labour participation. Two of the most significant challenges facing the labour market are maintaining participation rates and improving our labour productivity rates. The CTU submits that low wages are an impediment to optimal labour market participation and impede productivity improvements.
- 10.2. The labour force participation rate at June 2013 of 68.8 percent is still not back to its peak of 69.1 percent in December 2008. Participation rates are not expected to grow due to an ageing population and older labour force.<sup>92</sup>
- 10.3. Strong active labour market policy approaches including higher wage rates are needed to re-encourage people back into the labour market following the negative social and economic effects from the global financial crisis.
- 10.4. The effect of high unemployment resulting from the global financial crisis is a cohort of workers discouraged and alienated from the labour market. The effects of the recession have been far worse for Māori and Pacific workers. Māori workers were more affected by the economic downturn in 2009 than European workers. Māori participation fell by 3.2 percentage points and that for Pacific people 3.3 percentage points in the year to December 2009, while European participation fell on 0.4 percentage points.
- 10.5. Māori and Pacific unemployment rates are still at high levels (Māori at 12.2 percent and Pasifika at 15.7 percent in September 2013) and this is despite the claims by this Government that measures such as the 90 day period at commencement of employment with no right of appeal against dismissal would increase employment for disadvantaged and unemployed groups.
- 10.6. For many industries it is vital to increase participation, yet this will remain difficult if they continue to pay low wages. The aged care sector is a case in point. This sector has high numbers of low paid women workers in their prime working age years (between 25 and 54) with low qualification levels. Yet the sector does not have the workforce to respond to the growing demand that is predicted.
- 10.7. The Department of Labour<sup>93</sup> estimated that caregiver numbers in the aged care sector need to more than double from the current 17,900 to 48,200 in order to meet the needs of the increasing number of older people requiring support in 2026.
- 10.8. Recommendations for this sector include increasing workforce participation among older workers, encouraging disengaged workers from the labour force to consider this work as a career, developing training programmes and

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<sup>92</sup> “Labour Force Participation in New Zealand”, Department of Labour, 2010.

<sup>93</sup> “The Future Demand for Paid Caregivers in a Rapidly Ageing Society”, Department of Labour, 2009.

established career structures in the sector, considering increased immigration of low skilled workers to provide workers for the sector, and increasing wage rates.

- 10.9. With the exception of looking to immigration as a solution, the CTU supports all these recommendations. Immigration, as a response to skills shortages, is an unsustainable way of dealing with labour force shortages. Significant problems already exist now with the migrants in the workforce including the aged care sector. Migrants are vulnerable and there are reports of shocking abuses of Filipino caregivers and nurses at the hands of immigration agents and employers.<sup>94</sup> The Caring Counts Inquiry reported on carers being unwilling to challenge unfair work practices because of fears of visa not being renewed.<sup>95</sup>
- 10.10. The Welfare Working Group recommended that solo parents' labour force participation must be increased and those recommendations are now being translated into legislative changes. We have serious concerns about the ruthless determination being shown to reduce the number of people on domestic purpose benefits without consideration of the social impacts let alone the labour market impacts given they are more likely to find only low paid and precarious work. This is discussed in Section 4 above.
- 10.11. Raising the minimum wage is unlikely to have an adverse effect on school leaving rates, and the contrary may well be the case. The research by Hyslop and Stillman confirms this (see Section 7). In addition, Timmins<sup>96</sup> has shown that one of the characteristics of those on the minimum wage is that they are studying. He found that 39.9 per cent of those aged 16-24 years are studying. But for young people earning on or near the minimum wage, the proportion studying was 58.7 per cent. Higher wages may in fact enable students to replace work time with study time. Studies by Hyslop and Stillman<sup>97</sup> and Pacheco and Cruickshank<sup>98</sup> have found that there have been some small and varying effects on education enrolment. However large increases in the youth minimum wage since 1999 have been accompanied by strongly increased educational participation. Many people on the minimum wage are studying; therefore a higher minimum wage could mean they could work fewer hours and have more time for studying.

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<sup>94</sup> "Embarrassed and Ashamed to be a New Zealander: A New Zealand Nurse shares her shame about the treatment of Filipino nurses in this country", T. O'Connor, Kai Tiaki Nursing New Zealand, May 2005.

<sup>95</sup> Caring Counts page 107

<sup>96</sup> "Minimum wage workers: Who are they?" by Jason Timmins, Department of Labour 2007, PANZ Conference, 3 July 2007.

<sup>97</sup> "Youth Minimum Wage Reform and the Labour Market" by Dean Hyslop and Steven Stillman, NZ Treasury Working Paper 04/03, March 2004.

<sup>98</sup> "Minimum Wage Effects on Educational Enrolments in New Zealand", G.A. Pacheco and A.A. Cruickshank, 2007.

- 10.12. Disabled people experience serious labour market disadvantage with a 45 percent labour participation rate as compared to a 68.8 overall percent labour participation rate. New Zealand’s signing of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has brought much greater awareness about the employment rights of people with disabilities.
- 10.13. Getting a decent job is one of the most significant challenges for disabled people. At every level of qualification, they are less likely than non-disabled people to be in the workforce.<sup>99</sup> Disabled people’s advocates say that if disabled people do get a job they are likely to “be stuck on the minimum wage for the rest of their life.”<sup>100</sup>
- 10.14. The CTU supports the need to improve the participation of disabled people in the paid workforce and to address the fundamental inequities faced by disabled people in regard to employment.
- 10.15. The repeal of the Disabled Persons in Employment Act helped bring New Zealand’s legislation in line with New Zealand and human rights norms. The CTU supported the repeal of the Act.
- 10.16. But the system of Minimum Wage Exemption Permits for workers with disabilities is in need of urgent review. Some changes were made this year to the way Permits are issued including an ability to issue exemptions for two years rather than one year.
- 10.17. As part of New Zealand’s compliance with the requirements of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, an Independent Monitoring Mechanism has been set up to monitor our compliance and reports annually. In their latest report they note (at p 145):<sup>101</sup>

The figures show the number of Minimum Wage Exemption Permits has remained at around the same level for the last five years. The number of people covered by minimum wage exemptions has decreased from approximately 5400 in 2001 to approximately 1000 in 2011–12.

There has been no significant evaluation of the Minimum Wage Exemption Permits since the system began. With reported wage rates as low as under \$1.00 per hour there is concern about whether the system is protecting workers’ rights, is administered consistently across the country and if there are more appropriate ways for people to take part in the workforce.

<sup>99</sup> “Tracking Equality at Work for Disabled People”, Human Rights Commission, June 2011.

<sup>100</sup> Personal Communication, disabled person’s advocate, October 2011.

<sup>101</sup> Annual report of the Independent Monitoring Mechanism of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 1 July 2011 – 30 June 2012 available at: <http://www.hrc.co.nz/disabled-people/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-with-disabilities/making-disability-rights-real>.

- 10.18. There are fundamental justice and employment issues that must be addressed around these exemptions. No other groups of workers are subject to productivity assessments for the purpose of paying people below the minimum wage. We share, with the Human Rights Commission and some Disabled Person Organisations a lack of confidence in these assessments being fair or justified.
- 10.19. Of the over 1000 Minimum Wage Exemption Permits, 53 percent of the people subject to them are paid less than \$3.00 an hour. The Equal Employment Opportunities Commissioner<sup>102</sup> reported rates of pay varied from just under the minimum wage to less than \$1.00 an hour (and as low as 15c an hour).
- 10.20. There has been no significant evaluation of the Minimum Wage Exemption Permits since the system began. There is concern about whether the system is protecting workers' rights, is administered consistently across the country and if there are more appropriate ways for people to take part in the workforce.
- 10.21. The CTU urges a review of the Minimum Wage Exemption Permits. While incomes for people who are on minimum wage exemption are in most cases supplemented by benefits, the current practice is embedding poverty and discrimination and is based on historical and outdated models of disability that prevent people with disabilities having opportunities to basic human and employment rights.

## 11. Social justice

- 11.1. A fair minimum wage level plays an important role in reducing inequalities. International evidence shows that changes in the minimum wage level are inversely correlated with the level of wage inequality.<sup>103</sup>
- 11.2. New Zealand's rates of inequality jumped dramatically from relatively low levels early to mid-1980s to the mid 1990s there was a rapid transition from well under the OECD average to well above. According to Perry,<sup>104</sup> "New Zealand's [Gini] score of 33 gave a ranking of 22nd out of 34" OECD countries.
- 11.3. From 2004 to 2007 inequality fell in New Zealand primarily as a result of the introduction of the Working for Families package. Inequality is anticipated to rise again due to the 2010 tax cuts and the unequal impacts of the recession. The Ministry of Social Development's Household Incomes Report

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<sup>102</sup> Human Rights Commission op.cit.

<sup>103</sup> "Low Wage Jobs and Pathways to Better Outcomes", by S. Richardson and L. Miller-Lewis, New Zealand Treasury Working Paper 02/29, Dec 2002, p 7.

<sup>104</sup> "Household incomes in New Zealand: Trends in indicators of inequality and hardship 1982 to 2012", prepared by Bryan Perry, Ministry of Social Development, July 2013, p.162.

2012 showed that income inequality rose in the year to June 2011 to an historic high.<sup>105</sup> Inequality levels remain volatile. They rose a little in the Household Economic Survey (HES) in 2009, fell in HES 2010, rose in HES 2011 and fell again in HES 2012<sup>106</sup>.

- 11.4. Working for Families is not a panacea to poverty. Perry notes that “Working-age adults in single-person households have the second highest poverty rate of all household types.” He reports that in 2011 and 2012, 31 percent of these people were below a constant value poverty threshold and this group constituted around 11 percent of those classified as poor.<sup>107</sup>
- 11.5. The unequal distribution of wealth in New Zealand is even more extreme than income inequalities. The wealthiest 1 percent of adults own 16 percent of the country’s total wealth, the top 10 percent of the population hold over 50 percent of total wealth, while the bottom half of the population hold 5.2 percent of total wealth.
- 11.6. The Social Inequality Survey 2009<sup>108</sup> found that New Zealanders want greater equality and agree that income differences are too large. Respondents saw lower income earners as being underpaid and that higher income earners are overpaid. Concern is growing. The August 2013 Roy Morgan opinion poll found 15 percent of those surveyed believed that “Poverty / The Gap Between Rich and Poor/ Imbalance of Wealth” is the most important economic issue the country faces. This is greater than the number who responded that the economy and unemployment were the most important issue: Both had 13 per cent ‘support.’<sup>109</sup>
- 11.7. Wilkinson and Pickett, in their widely discussed book, *The Spirit Level*<sup>110</sup>, have marshalled strong evidence to show that wealthy societies with very wide income inequalities have worse outcomes than less wealthy societies with smaller inequalities.
- 11.8. The book, *Inequality, An New Zealand Crisis*,<sup>111</sup> published this year, has resulted in a much greater public focus on inequality in New Zealand. It describes income inequality as one of the most significant and complex

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<sup>105</sup> “Household incomes in New Zealand: Trends in indicators of inequality and hardship 1982 to 2011”, prepared by Bryan Perry, Ministry of Social Development, August 2012..

<sup>106</sup> “Household incomes in New Zealand: Trends in indicators of inequality and hardship 1982 to 2012”, prepared by Bryan Perry, Ministry of Social Development, July 2013

<sup>107</sup> Op cit., p.126.

<sup>108</sup> “Social Inequality”, International Survey Programme Massey University March 2010.

<sup>109</sup> See <http://www.roymorgan.com/findings/5111-new-zealand-issues-august-2013-201308200005>.

<sup>110</sup> “The Spirit Level: Why Equal Societies Almost Always do Better”, by R. Wilkinson and K. Pickett, 2009.

<sup>111</sup> *Inequality a New Zealand Crisis* by Max Rashbrooke (ed) Bridget William Books , Wellington, New Zealand

issues confronting New Zealand today and describes how unequal this country has become with evidence of :

- New Zealand having one of the widest income gaps since records began in the 1990s.
- From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s the gap between the rich and the rest widening faster in New Zealand than in any other developed country.
- The average household in the top 10 percent of New Zealand having nine times the income of one in the bottom 10 percent.

- 11.9. Increasing costs for households are reflected in increasing child poverty rates. Housing costs are an important factor in child poverty rates as housing costs generally make up a greater proportion of household income for lower income than for higher income households. The Children’s Social Health Monitor<sup>112</sup> reports that from 1982–2011, trends in relative child poverty after adjustment for housing costs were broadly similar to before housing cost measures. But in 2011 after housing cost child poverty rates were higher than in the 1980s, while before housing cost measures were closer to 1980s levels.
- 11.10. Poverty rates for children in beneficiaries’ households are much higher than for children in families with at least one adult in full time employment. Nevertheless around two in five poor children are from households where at least one adult is in full time employment or is self-employed.
- 11.11. The 2012 report by the Children’s Commissioner looking at solutions to child poverty is unequivocal about the need to find solutions to child poverty stating, “Poverty costs. It harms those directly affected and the wider society. It undermines children’s rights to develop their gifts and talents. It reduces opportunities, stifles educational achievements, reduces labour productivity and increases health care costs”. The report confirmed that one of the major issues facing children living in poverty is poor quality and unaffordable housing. The report also stated that increasing parents’ employment earnings is the most important way to move children out of poverty.<sup>113</sup>
- 11.12. The health status of our children with respect to preventable diseases is now poorer than before 1990. Poverty rates for children in Māori and Pacific ethnic groups are consistently higher than those of European/Pakeha ethnicity.

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<sup>112</sup> Children’s Social Health Monitor (2012), Update:  
[http://www.nzchildren.co.nz/document\\_downloads/2012CSHM3\\_Child\\_Poverty\\_and\\_Living\\_Standards.pdf](http://www.nzchildren.co.nz/document_downloads/2012CSHM3_Child_Poverty_and_Living_Standards.pdf)

<sup>113</sup> Solutions to Child Poverty, Issues and Options Paper for Consultation, Expert Advisory Group on Solutions to Child Poverty, August 2012.

- 11.13. The level of the minimum wage is a critical component of the issues around about what is a fair and adequate income. The level at which the minimum wage is set also tells us about how we value people, how we value their skills and their contribution through their employment.
- 11.14. A fundamental principle for the CTU is that if a job is only provided at wages persistently below a level required for a dignified life then society is better off without that job. An income standard protects people who for lack of knowledge, or out of desperation, will work for substandard wages. An adequate minimum wage level is an essential part of setting such a standard.
- 11.15. Poverty results in an inability for many New Zealanders to fully participate in society. Families on low incomes have to make choices that mean that children's participation in sport and cultural activities are among unaffordable luxuries. Other restrictions on participation include not being able to invite friends over for a meal or birthday party, not going on school outings or not being able to have friends or family over to stay.
- 11.16. It is these concerns that, as noted in Section 3, have led faith based groups, other community organisations and unions to join together and form the "Living Wage Campaign" and call for the Living Wage as a necessary step in reducing inequality and poverty in society. This campaign has changed the debate about wages with a fast growing acceptance that earnings should be based on what workers need to survive and participate in society and not on the market alone.
- 11.17. The World Health Organisation's Commission on the Social Determinants of Health stated that decent work is one of the means to reduce inequalities and that "fair employment and decent conditions of work help eradicate poverty, alleviate social inequities reduce exposure to physical and psychosocial hazards and enhance opportunities for health and wellbeing."<sup>114</sup>
- 11.18. A social justice approach focuses on what needs to be done to improve the position of children in New Zealand. We are very concerned that current Social Welfare reforms that have introduced new work expectations and work preparation expectations will effectively force solo parents into paid work.
- 11.19. Solo parents are more likely to be in low paid work. Poor quality employment and enduring low wages increase social inequalities. As the Review of Health Inequalities in England commented, "The quality of work matters. Getting people off benefits and into low paid and insecure and health damming work is not a desirable option."<sup>115</sup> This is discussed more fully in

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<sup>114</sup> "Closing the Gap in a Generation", Commission on Social Determinants of Health, 2008.

<sup>115</sup> "Fair Society, Healthy Lives: A Strategic Review of Health Inequalities in England Post-2010", M. Marmot et al, 2010; London: The Marmot Review, available at <http://www.marmotreview.org>.

section 4 above. Full employment should be a primary goal of any government, but we do not accept the view that paid work should be the ultimate goal at any cost. The outcome of that is that any wage will do. Employment must be decently paid. A strong reason for increasing the minimum wage is that it will have a beneficial impact on children and some impact on reducing child poverty rates.

- 11.20. Housing is unaffordable for many New Zealanders and house prices are expected to remain high for the foreseeable future. The 2013 Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey reported that housing in New Zealand in 2012 remains severely unaffordable with a median multiple of 5.3, slightly higher than last year's 5.2.<sup>116</sup> Houses in New Zealand are now nearly 80 percent more expensive than the historic affordability norm of 3, last experienced in the 1990s.
- 11.21. For lower-income people high housing costs relative to income can leave households with insufficient income to meet other basic needs such as food, clothing, transport, health care and education.
- 11.22. The median house price in New Zealand increased by over 50 percent between 2004 and 2008. Housing is regarded as "affordable" if people or households spend no more than 30 percent of disposable income on housing. There has been a substantial increase in the proportion of households spending more than 30 percent of their income on housing since the late-1980s. In 2009, 27 percent of New Zealand households spent more than 30 percent of their disposable income on housing costs.
- 11.23. The ability to access quality housing is related to income, with higher income earners generally able to attain high quality housing. High housing costs relative to household incomes are a source of huge stress for low-income households.
- 11.24. Increases in house prices have raised the wealth of home owners and driven a widening gap between the affordability of houses and the incomes of people who aspire to own a home. Wealth inequalities within New Zealand have increased as a result of increased house prices.

## **12. Gender Pay Gap**

- 12.1. Reducing the gender pay gap is an essential consideration in deciding the appropriate minimum wage increase. We note that the changes made by Cabinet in 2012 have removed consideration of the gender pay gap as a criterion in deciding the level of the minimum wage. It should be reinstated.

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<sup>116</sup> "8th Annual Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey: 2013", Demographia, available at <http://www.demographia.com/dhi.pdf>.

- 12.2. Minimum wage changes are very significant for women, especially Māori and Pacific women who are over represented in low waged work, both on and near to the minimum wage. Minimum wage decisions play a dual role by increasing wage equity and encouraging labour force participation particularly among low wage employees.
- 12.3. In a paper on “Decent Work” to the International Labour Congress in 2009, minimum wages were described “not as a panacea but an essential element in a more comprehensive policy approach to tackle the persistent gender pay gap”<sup>117</sup>. In New Zealand, increases in the minimum wage have been shown to make a small but important contribution in reducing the gender pay gap.<sup>118</sup>
- 12.4. As low pay is an enduring feature in the working life of many women workers, the impact of minimum wage levels is greater. Women are more likely to be in low paid work than men. This is largely due to the undervaluation of skills in female dominated work.
- 12.5. Government action to recognise this undervaluation and to employ processes to evaluate skills and raise pay levels in female dominated work is now at a standstill. The level of the minimum wage thus becomes even more important to decrease the gender pay gap and improve the position of low paid women workers.
- 12.6. Using the definition of low pay as less than two-thirds of the average hourly rate, 573,100 people are on wages below the Living wage figure of \$18.40 according to data used by MBIE for the Minimum Wage 2012 review.<sup>119</sup>
- 12.7. Information provided to the New Zealand Herald under the Official Information Act shows that there are 716,500 people on hourly earnings from their main job below \$18.40 of whom 314,100 are male and 402,500 are female<sup>120</sup>. A gender breakdown finds that 34 percent of men are on hourly earnings from their main job that are less than \$18.40 compared to 44 percent of women.
- 12.8. Overall the labour participation rates is 68.6 percent. Female labour force participation increased slightly to 63.0 percent in the September 2013 quarter (up from 62.6 percent in June 2013 but the same as the 63.0 percent in September 2012). But it is characterised by a growth in employment areas where there is less full time work and in the low paid

<sup>117</sup> “Gender and the Minimum wage”, by J. Roberti and D. Grimshaw, Paper to the ILO conference, 2009.

<sup>118</sup> “Understanding Reductions in the Gender Wage Differential -1997- 2003”, by S. Dixon, paper at New Zealand Conference for Pay and Employment Equity, 2004, Wellington.

<sup>119</sup> Official Information Act request by Annie Newman ( 2013) to the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment on the Minimum Wage Review 2012

<sup>120</sup> Statistics New Zealand (2013), Official Information Act request by the New Zealand Herald.

sectors of retail, hospitality and other service sectors.<sup>121</sup> For the period June 2011-June 2012, full-time employment for females decreased by 6,000 while their part-time employment increased by 18,200. In contrast, full-time employment for males rose 12,400 while their part-time employment fell 1,700.

- 12.9. Women predominate in lower paid part-time work. In a study commissioned by the National Advisory Council on the Employment of Women (NACEW), examining the extent to which low wages endure for women during their prime years (defined as aged 25- 54) it was found that the main reasons for working part time were their greater role in caring responsibilities and their inability to find suitable full time given those responsibilities.<sup>122</sup>
- 12.10. The penalty for such part time work for women is lower earnings not only overall but also on an hourly basis. The average hourly rate of part time workers is lower than full time workers. Over one-third of women work part time, three times the men's part time rate and 10 percent above the OECD average.
- 12.11. In addition, career progression for women in the labour market is made more difficult because of the concentration of women in jobs that are not only low paid and part time but also have very shallow pay structures.<sup>123</sup> Poorer skill utilisation within the part time workforce compared to that of full time work compounds difficulties and impedes career progression.
- 12.12. Statistics New Zealand Quarterly Employment Survey data from the September 2013 quarter shows that men earn 15.5 percent more than women measured by their respective average ordinary time hourly wages, which is a smaller gap than it was a year before (16.2 percent) when it jumped up briefly, but higher than two years before (14.4 percent). We are aware that different surveys do report different gender gaps depending on the measure used. The issue is, however, the persistence of the gender pay gap and all survey data is consistent in showing lack of any real change.
- 12.13. The 2013 New Zealand Income Survey also confirms that there is no progress reducing the gender pay gap. Looking at average hourly earnings there is a 13 percent gap between the earnings of men and women – the same as the 2012 results.
- 12.14. The minimum wage has an important role in reducing not only gender discrimination in the labour market but also in reducing ethnic discrimination. The tables below show that ethnicity compounds gender pay gaps with

<sup>121</sup> "New Zealand Women's Employment Outcomes, the relationship between working shorter hours and low-paid, female-dominated occupations", NACEW, 2010.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

<sup>123</sup> "Women and Part-time Work – a stocktake of recent research, A report to NACEW", M. Dwyer, R. Ryan, September 2011.

ethnic gaps even wider than gender pay gaps. The widest earnings gap, as in past years, is between Pacific women and Pakeha men with Pacific women earning only 68.6 percent of the hourly rate of Pakeha men.

**Average hourly earnings comparisons by main gender and ethnic groups of wage and salary earners: NZ Income Survey June 2013 <sup>124</sup>**

	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>All</i>
<b>Pakeha</b>	\$24.82	\$29.30	\$27.08
<b>Māori</b>	\$22.05	\$22.83	\$22.45
<b>Pacific</b>	\$20.11	\$20.98	\$20.59
<b>All</b>	\$24.19	\$27.72	\$26.00

**Women’s pay by ethnicity relative to other groups**

		<i>Relative to:</i>				
		<b>Pakeha women</b>	<b>Māori men</b>	<b>Pacific men</b>	<b>Pakeha men</b>	<b>All men</b>
<b>Women</b>	<b>Pakeha women</b>	100.00%	108.72%	118.3 %	84.7%	87.3%
	<b>Māori women</b>	88.8 %	96.6 %	105.1%	75.1%	79.5%
	<b>Pacific women</b>	81%	88%	95.6%	68.6%	72.5 %

12.15. As stated earlier, virtually all support for government action on pay and employment equity for low-paid women has now ceased. The review by the Equal Employment Opportunities Commissioner examining the public sector gender pay gap shows slippage and little progress in reducing gender discrimination in employment in the public service. The New Zealand Census of Women’s Participation 2012 reported on an overall gender pay gap in the public service of 14.3 percent in the 32 Public Service Departments reviewed<sup>125</sup>.

12.16. This reinforced the results of the pay reviews undertaken in the public service between 2004 and 2008 that found gender pay gaps ranging from 3 to 35 percent as well as unequal salaries for the same job. Other findings include female dominated jobs being paid lower than male dominated jobs, gender disparities in pay progression and performance pay, and women predominating among the lowest paid staff and forming a minority of those in the best paid jobs.

<sup>124</sup> Source: Statistics NZ Income Survey, June quarter 2012, Table 10

<sup>125</sup> New Zealand Census of Women’s Participation, Human Rights Commission, 2010/2012.

- 12.17. Only one government department of the 32 reviewed in the recent census by the Equal Employment Opportunities Commissioner had a pay gap in favour of women. Eleven of the 32 departments had gaps of 20 percent or more.<sup>126</sup>
- 12.18. This lack of action on pay and employment equity does not equate with official government policy which affirms that responding to gender inequalities is part of being a good employer in both the public and private sectors.<sup>127</sup>
- 12.19. There has been no impact from the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MWA) work programme for low-waged women workers. One of their work programmes had a focus on low paid workers – career pathways for women in low paid occupations. But there have been no outcomes from this programme despite the compelling need for work in this sector with a predominantly low paid female workforce.
- 12.20. The United Nations Committee reviewing the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) noted in its last report that the Ministry of Women’s Affairs lacks a consistent policy for bridging the persistent wage gaps between women and men.<sup>128</sup> The Committee also recommended that a monitoring institution for gender pay inequality be established within the “State party’s administration, despite the closure of the Pay and Employment Equity Unit in the Department of Labour.”<sup>129</sup>
- 12.21. The 2012 report by the Human Rights Commission into the employment conditions of carers in the aged care sector described the level of wages for these workers as “an injustice grounded in historical undervaluation of the role.”<sup>130</sup>
- 12.22. The estimated 25,000-30,000 caregivers working in the aged residential care sector are one of the lowest paid occupational groups in New Zealand. Pay rates in the sector are commonly at, or close to minimum wage rates. There are instances of caregivers who have worked for 13 years in a facility still being on the minimum wage.<sup>131</sup>

<sup>126</sup> “Public Sector Pay and Employment Equity Reviews: Overview Report”, Department of Labour, June 2009.

<sup>127</sup> “Crown Entities and the Good Employer”, Human Rights Commission, 2010

<sup>128</sup> Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 52<sup>nd</sup> Session , 9-27 July, 2012.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid, page 8.

<sup>130</sup> “Caring Counts”, Human Rights Commission, May 2012.

<sup>131</sup> A Report into Age Care: “What does the Future Hold for Older New Zealanders”, October 2010.

- 12.23. New Zealand researcher Maire Dwyer<sup>132</sup> notes that many economists and policy makers fail to make the connection between lower earnings and labour force participation and unfulfilled productive potential and regard the labour market participation of parent mothers as simply reflecting family preferences. Yet, as she said, these attitudes are simply out of step with attitudes of parents about employment and parenting and parental choice.
- 12.24. Gender inequity in workplaces is likely to be associated with a loss of productive potential when women are in jobs that are below their skill level, and some women opt to stay out of the workforce because wages are too low to make working worthwhile.
- 12.25. A fair minimum wage level will help to reduce an important cause of women’s low pay and gender inequity. We believe that the Ministry of Women’s Affairs is misled in its thinking that the focus for reducing the pay gap should be by increasing the participation of women in male dominated work. The thinking reflects a stereotypical attitude that women who work in low paid occupations do so because of a lack of training or education. Evidence shows that as occupational groups become more female-dominated, the pay rate for the work lowers, resulting in a declining relative wage as the female workforce increases.<sup>133</sup> The major contributor to the gender pay gap is the undervaluing and underpayment of women in low-paid female dominated occupations.
- 12.26. Unionisation is a protective factor for low paid workers and collective bargaining reduces the gender pay gap. But in low paid, insecure and precarious work, large sectors of the workforce are un-unionised. This exposes these workers, who are more likely to be women, to very low paid work and wages that are totally dependent on minimum wage increases for any wage increase.

### **13. International commitments – UN & ILO**

- 13.1. New Zealand has committed to provide fair just and favourable conditions of remuneration to all workers by ratification of several binding international instruments including:
- The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR);
  - The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)

<sup>132</sup> “The Economic Rationales for Narrowing the Gender Pay Gap”, by Maire Dwyer, June 2006, National Advisory Council on the Employment of Women, available at <http://www.nacew.govt.nz/publications/quality/women/index.html>.

<sup>133</sup> “Job Queues, Gender Queues: Explaining Women’s Inroads into Male Occupations”, by B.F. Reskin and P. Roos (1990), Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

- The International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD);
  - The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD);
  - The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CROC);
  - The ILO Declaration of Philadelphia
  - ILO Convention No. 26 on Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery (C26);
  - ILO Convention No. 99 on Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery (Agriculture (C99);
  - ILO Convention No. 100 on Equal Remuneration (C100);
  - ILO Convention No. 111 on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) (C111);
- 13.2. article 7(a) of ICESCR mirrors the language of article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in calling for State Parties to recognise the right of everyone to “[f]air wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind” and a “decent living for themselves and their families.”
- 13.3. The constitution of the ILO incorporates the Declaration of Philadelphia. Article III(d) of the Declaration states that governments have a responsibility to pursue “policies in regard to wages and earnings, hours and other conditions of work calculated to ensure a just share of the fruits of progress to all, and a minimum living wage to all employed and in need of such protection.”
- 13.4. Article 11 of CEDAW requires state parties to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination in employment. CEDAW specifically refers to equal pay for equal work and “fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value”.
- 13.5. New Zealand took a leading role in the development of CRPD. Article 27 of CRPD includes provisions that prohibit discrimination in employment for people with disabilities; protects the rights of persons with disabilities to just and favourable conditions of work including equal remuneration, and equal remuneration for work of equal value; and states that people with disabilities must be able to exercise their labour and trade union rights on an equal basis with others.
- 13.6. As noted in section 10, as part of New Zealand’s compliance with the requirements of the CRPD, an Independent Monitoring Mechanism (IMM) has been set up to monitor our compliance which reports annually. We support the calls from the IMM to review the Minimum Wage Exemption Permitting scheme.

- 13.7. C26 and C99 set out the requirements for New Zealand to operate a central wage fixing system and which sectors it may apply to. Article 3 of C26 holds that workers and employers must be consulted on the operation of that machinery.
- 13.8. C26 came into force in 1940 and was ratified by New Zealand in 1948. Since then, the ILO has create an updated Convention No. 131 on Minimum Wage Fixing in 1970 (C131). C131 provides a more modern framework for consultation on wage fixing and consultation than C26. C131 mandates a more principled review process than C26. For example, article 3 states:

The elements to be taken into consideration in determining the level of minimum wages shall, so far as possible and appropriate in relation to national practice and conditions, include --

(a) the needs of workers and their families, taking into account the general level of wages in the country, the cost of living, social security benefits, and the relative living standards of other social groups;

(b) economic factors, including the requirements of economic development, levels of productivity and the desirability of attaining and maintaining a high level of employment.

- 13.9. The ILO has urged New Zealand to consider ratification of this convention for years. We believe there are few and minor obstacles to ratification and recommend that steps are taken to ratify C131.

#### **14. Addressing the Objectives of the Minimum Wage Review**

- 14.1. The process for the Minimum Wage Review was changed in 2012. This includes a new objective:

To keep increasing the minimum wage over time to protect the real incomes of low-paid workers while minimising job losses.

- 14.2. The CTU believes that the revised objective contains two flawed assumptions. The first is that the minimum wage is currently at the correct level and therefore should only be increased in order “to protect the real incomes of low-paid workers.” This fails to recognise the significance of the minimum wage as a macroeconomic lever to address issues of social justice, income inequality, poverty and improvement of the position of disadvantaged groups.
- 14.3. We do not believe that this narrow consideration adequately guarantees citizens’ rights to “a just and favourable remuneration” under article 23(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or to provision of an adequate living wage under the Declaration of Philadelphia.

- 14.4. The second flawed assumption is that increasing the minimum wage leads to significant job losses. See section 7 of our submission for further details.
- 14.5. We encourage the Government to recognise the importance of increasing the minimum wage as a tool to improve social outcomes, productivity and social justice and to recognise these as 'other factors' in terms of the criteria for assessment.
- 14.6. The criteria are now much more limited. Inflation in the September 2012 year was 0.8 percent and in the September 2013 year was 1.4 percent. It would be a totally cynical approach for the Government to base any movement on inflation in the last year only. We note that the average ordinary time hourly wage as measured by the Quarterly Employment Survey increased by 2.6 percent in the year to September. The median wage in our view is not the most important comparator because it is falling behind the average wage (see paragraph 5.13 and the accompanying graph). The minimum wage is also about equity and basing it on a ratio (such as 66 percent) of the average wage recognises and corrects for the effects of widening income disparity.
- 14.7. The changed process also drastically reduces the input of many groups and organisations into the review process. In 2011, 32 groups and organisations submitted on the minimum wage review. Many of those groups, organisations and agencies have now no way to make submissions or have their views on the minimum wage level heard. Restricting the input of organisations and groups, agencies into a matter of such critical importance is a backwards step.
- 14.8. The minimum wage review is a significant annual opportunity for the Government to intervene to support those on low incomes. That requires a broad-based enquiry against rigorous and balanced criteria along with widespread consultation. Narrowing the criteria and limiting the depth of the review are retrograde steps. The Government has significantly undermined the integrity of the review process by these changes.
- 14.9. A number of questions were asked in the invitation to contribute to this year's review. Our responses are as follows:

1. *What impacts have you observed as a result of changes to the minimum wage? (You may wish to discuss the April 2013 increase, and/or increases over the past 5 years. Please define the time period you are discussing).*

Evidence of the impacts of changes to the minimum wage are spread throughout our submission (and we refer to differing time periods for each).

In section 3, we provide evidence that the minimum wage is too low in relative terms and that growth in the minimum wage has slowed significantly (or reversed in the case of the minimum wage for young people) since 2008 and well below historical level relative to the average wage.

The slow growth of the minimum wage has disproportionately affected part-time workers, women, under-25s, Māori, Pacific, Asian and other ethnic

minorities along with those in service-related, retail and hospitality industries (see section 4).

A low minimum wage keeps New Zealand's general wage levels low and traps many workers and employers in a low-wage low-skill equilibrium (sections 5 and 6). It has negative consequences for equality, child poverty, the gender pay gap and labour participation rates (sections 10, 11 and 12).

Evidence is clear that increases in the minimum wage have not increased unemployment (see section 7 and appendix 1).

2. *What are the gains or positive impacts likely to be from a moderate increase in the minimum wage rates for the people you represent? (The 2013 increase was 25 cents).*

The use of the term “a moderate increase in the minimum wage” suggests some predetermination in the minimum wage review or begs the question of what constitutes a moderate increase.

An increase in the minimum wage that is greater than the increase in the cost of living and raises the minimum wage towards two-thirds of the average wage will assist in making New Zealand a more equal society including by narrowing the gender pay gap (see sections 11 and 12). It is likely to assist in raising productivity (section 6).

A rise in the minimum wage towards a ‘living wage’ is more consistent with New Zealand's international treaty commitments (see section 13) and is good for New Zealand's international reputation.

3. *What are the costs or negative impacts likely to be from a moderate increase in the minimum wage rates for the people you represent? (The 2013 increase was 25 cents).*

See discussion of “moderate increase” under question 2 above.

4. *How do you see the minimum wage working with other employment and income related government interventions? (For example the tax system and social assistance).*

See sections 2 and 11 for more details. While the Working for Families package was a significant contributor to the decline in inequality in New Zealand between 2004 and 2007, the inapplicability of the In-Work Tax Credit to beneficiary families is a significant cause of child poverty in New Zealand. An explicit reason for this exclusion is to create an incentive to enter work. A higher minimum wage would allow the extension of the In Work Tax Credit while creating a real incentive to enter work without requiring benefits to be kept at a level which keeps families in poverty and deprivation. Single-person households constitute a significant section of people in poverty and are not covered by Working for Families.

Actions taken by the Government to force more beneficiaries into work are almost certainly increasing unemployment while in many cases not resolving issues of poverty and lack of future prospects.

5. *What sector or industry-specific issues related to changes in the minimum wage are you aware of? In what circumstances or types of work?*

Several industries with female-dominated workforces such as residential aged care have large cohorts of workers at or near the minimum wage. This has a significant impact on the gender pay gap (see section 12).

See also our discussion of training rates in section 9.

6. *Do you think there are any additional issues relating to minimum wage rates that are relevant to specific groups you represent? (eg: women, Maori, Pacific Island peoples, people with disabilities, migrants, temporary workers, SME's or employers?)*

The re-introduction of youth sub-minimum wages in the form of the starting out wage has significantly disadvantaged young people in a discriminatory and unfair manner (see section 8). There is little or no evidence that cutting their wages will result in more work.

The CTU echoes the call of the Independent Monitoring Mechanism on the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities regarding a review of the Minimum Wage Exemption Permits which have not been examined since their introduction in 2007 (see section 10).

7. *What would you consider an appropriate setting for the 2014 adult minimum wage? Why?*

See section 2 (and particularly paras 2.8 and 2.9).

8. *Are there any other issues you would like to raise in relation to changes to the minimum wage rates?*

See our recommendations. We urge the Government to reinstate wider consultation and consideration of social justice and equity factors in the setting of the minimum wage (see section 14).

We believe that the Government should consider ratification of ILO Convention No. 131 on Minimum Wage Fixing as representative of best practice in this area (see section 13).

## 9. **Conclusion**

- 9.1. The CTU has put forward a comprehensive submission making a clear case for a significant increase in the minimum wage for the review in 2013.
- 9.2. The CTU continues to be very concerned by the Government's changes to the minimum wage review. Narrowing the criteria, limiting the depth of the

review and the number of submissions and severely reducing the time frame for the review are all retrograde steps. There are numerous interested parties who have submitted in previous years who should also be consulted in this review but do not have the opportunity to do so. We urge the Minister of Labour and MBIE to extend its consultation process and the timeframe for the minimum wage review.

- 9.3. The CTU looks forward to the opportunity for further dialogue on the contents of this submission.

## 10. Appendix: Research literature review

- 10.1. Research on the minimum wage and employment effects has been a contentious area, with several competing theories and the development of increasingly sophisticated methodologies to test effects empirically. This review surveys some of the theoretical approaches and then looks at the empirical evidence concluding with some of the most recent findings.
- 10.2. Our analysis of this review suggests that:
- a) The question is essentially an empirical one which must take into account the context of specific local and national labour markets; and
  - b) Employment effects, when correctly measured by taking the full context into account, are zero or minimally positive or negative. Studies that fail to control properly for local and sectoral differences may spuriously detect negative employment effects.

However the purpose of this appendix is to set out more fully a range of perspectives and a survey of research and evidence.

- 10.3. The overall effects of a minimum wage on total employment depends on a number of factors, including the elasticity of labour supply to wages and to demand for labour, the reservation wages of those who do not find work in the sector covered by the minimum wage, and the relative size of this covered sector.<sup>134</sup>
- 10.4. The main empirical difficulty is to isolate the wage effects from other exogenous influences. For example, if the demand curve for labour is itself shifting, this is an additional influence on employment which has to be separated out.
- 10.5. Traditional economic theory would say that an increase in the minimum wage that leads to an increase in wages which does not correspond to an increase in productivity would reduce employment.
- 10.6. The purported negative effects of the minimum wage on employment result from the combination of two elements: a substitution effect and a scale effect.
- 10.7. The substitution effect means that firms could decide to use more capital than labour as the latter becomes more expensive and, secondly, they could substitute skilled-labour for unskilled-labour.
- 10.8. The scale effect is the result of a fall in sales due to cost increases, leading to a reduction in the use of both factors, capital and labour (including low-skilled labour).

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<sup>134</sup> “Minimum Wages and Youth Unemployment”, Youcef Ghellab, ILO, 1998.

- 10.9. A basic market model treats wages like any price and labour like any other commodity. It ignores the social or human dimension of selling and buying labour. Apart from common market problems such as asymmetric information about the “market” and the cost of negative externalities, there are other ways in which the labour market operates not related to wages (prices) such as quality adjustments. The literature on why the labour market is different from other markets includes explanations such as quantity-constrained models, Human Capital Theory, Search Theory, Bargaining Theory, insider/outsider models, segmented labour markets, internal labour markets, efficiency wages, and monopsony employer power. Some of these are discussed below.
- 10.10. Efficiency Wage Theory is based on the supposition that higher real wages can, through various mechanisms, result in higher labour productivity. Wages above the average increase incentives to work and lead to better economic performance, through lower absenteeism and better adaptation of workers. It suggests that, in the absence of any wages regulation, and if unemployment is high and supply of labour abundant, wages can fall dramatically, leading to poverty among workers. It suggests that such a decline in real wages will produce a drop in both labour productivity and the firms’ profits.
- 10.11. Turnover has been one of the most important focal points of efficiency wage theory. In general, low wages are associated with high turnover, and the latter is itself associated with the loss of firm-specific skills and hence a decline in labour productivity. Alternatively, Akerlof has discussed how labour productivity may rise as a result of additional efforts made by workers if they regard their wage as a “fair wage” and also how higher wages may allow the firm to attract the most skilled workers.<sup>135</sup>
- 10.12. Exploiting the natural experiment provided by the 1999 introduction of the UK National Minimum Wage to test for efficiency wage considerations in a low-wage sector, the UK residential care homes industry, Georgiadis<sup>136</sup> finds support for the suggestion that the National Minimum Wage may have operated as an efficiency wage in the care homes sector, leading to a reduction in supervision costs. These findings can explain earlier evidence suggesting that although the National Minimum Wage introduction increased wages dramatically in the care homes sector, it generated only modest, if any negative employment effects

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<sup>135</sup> “Gift Exchange and efficiency – Wage Theory: four views”, by George A. Akerlof, *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 74 – No. 2, 1984, p.81.

<sup>136</sup> “Efficiency Wages and the Economic Effects of the Minimum Wage: Evidence from a Low-Wage Labour Market”. by A Georgiadis, 2012, *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics*,

- 10.13. One study found that the lower the firm's wage is relative to the average wage in the economy, the higher the quit rate.<sup>137</sup> This is relevant in a New Zealand context of high turnover and low job tenure detailed in paragraphs 6.20 to 6.27.
- 10.14. Theories based on monopsonistic employer power are gaining support. The evidence comes from both minimum wage research (see for example Dube's recent review of research<sup>138</sup>) and more general labour market studies which find evidence of the reluctance of employees to change jobs,<sup>139</sup> conferring power on employers to unilaterally set wages. These theories have some commonality with Efficiency Wage approaches, also emphasising employer wishes to reduce the costs of turnover. Employers have the power to decide whether to pay more to reduce the costs of turnover, or pay less to save on payroll costs. Their optimal wage (and employment) level may be above that predicted from a simple market model, but employment will be less than would be socially optimal because they will not want to pay higher wages to employees who are unlikely to quit. Raising the minimum wage within a range at which profits are still being made will encourage more employees to stay and will increase recruitment.
- 10.15. Macro-economic aspects are integral to Keynesian wage theories. These put more emphasis on the effects of wages in generating aggregate demand and anchoring prices in the economy. They predict that raising the real minimum wage can help prevent deflation during a recession, compress the wage distribution, and change the structure of demand for goods and services, but will not have a systematic effect on employment. The employment effect is indeterminate because any increase in the minimum wage will have both direct effects which depend on the competitiveness of each industry and the elasticity of demand for its products as prices change, and indirect effects as spending patterns change and industries adjust by adopting new technology and buying the capital and intermediate goods required. In addition, there may be an increase in aggregate demand which will increase employment. The net effect cannot be determined in theoretical terms and only with great difficulty empirically.<sup>140</sup>

<sup>137</sup> "Common elements of efficiency wage theories: what relevance for developing countries?", by Luis A. Riveros and Lawrence Bouton, *The Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 30 – No. 3, April 1994, p.696-716

<sup>138</sup> "Minimum Wage Laws and the Labor Market: What Have We Learned Since Card and Krueger's Book *Myth and Measurement*?", Arindrajit Dube, 1 September 2011, <http://www.newdeal20.org/2011/09/01/minimum-wage-laws-and-the-labor-market-what-have-we-learned-since-card-and-kruegers-book-myth-and-measurement-57160/>.

<sup>139</sup> See for example "Modern Models of Monopsony in Labor Markets: A Brief Survey", by Orley C. Ashenfelter, Henry Farber, and Michael R Ransom, Working Paper 554, Princeton University Industrial Relations Section, April 2010, available at [http://www.irs.princeton.edu/working\\_papers.php](http://www.irs.princeton.edu/working_papers.php).

<sup>140</sup> See Hansjörg Herr, Mika Kazandziska and Silke Mahnkopf-Praprotnik, "The Theoretical Debate about Minimum Wages" Working Paper No. 6, Global Labour University Working Papers. Berlin:

- 10.16. Ian McDonald,<sup>141</sup> for example, takes a Keynesian approach to minimum wage setting in the Australian economy which he says is based on “the importance for the employment of those on minimum wages of aggregate demand and the importance for aggregate demand management of the inflation targeting based monetary policy”. He considers that “in Australia at the moment the employment of people who earn minimum wages is determined primarily and substantially by the level of aggregate demand. Relative wages play a small role.” He proposes an annual rate of increase in minimum wages of productivity growth plus the Reserve Bank of Australia’s inflation target.
- 10.17. As the ILO noted as far back as 1998, the conventional view that the introduction of a minimum wage that raises the wages of a fraction of workers above what they would otherwise have received, would automatically reduce the employment prospects of that particular category of workers, is far from being a dominant view.<sup>142</sup>
- 10.18. The standard view was reinforced in the United States in a number of studies conducted in the 1970’s which found that there was a significant negative link between the minimum wage and youth employment, such that a 10 per cent increase in the federal minimum wage would lead to a decline in the employment rate ranging from 1 to 3 per cent.
- 10.19. Brown, Gilroy and Kohen<sup>143</sup> estimated that from 1954 to 1979, a 10 percent increase in adult minimum wages (using US data) reduced teenage employment by between 1 per cent and 3 per cent. But subsequent analysis, which carried the data forward into the 1980s, found that the estimated elasticity weakened and by 1990 the reduction in employment was close to zero.
- 10.20. The evidence for nine countries presented in the OECD’s Employment Outlook 1998 suggested that higher minima adversely affected teenage employment: a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage was associated with a 1.5–3 per cent decline in teenage employment, the effects being essentially the same across countries regardless of whether they had high or low minimum wages.
- 10.21. But when in 1992, New Jersey increased the state minimum wage to \$5.05 an hour (applicable to both the public and private sectors), David Card and

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Global Labour University, p.24. Retrieved from [http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed\\_dialogue/---actrav/documents/publication/wcms\\_115075.pdf](http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---actrav/documents/publication/wcms_115075.pdf)

<sup>141</sup> “A macroeconomic perspective on the setting of minimum wages”, by Ian McDonald, University of Melbourne, in 2008 Minimum Wage Research Forum Proceedings, Volume 1, Australian Fair Pay Commission, p.27-43.

<sup>142</sup> “Minimum Wages and Youth Unemployment”, by Youcef Ghellab, ILO, 1998, p. 8.

<sup>143</sup> “The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Employment and Unemployment”, Charles Brown, Curtis Gilroy and Andrew Kohen, Journal of Economic Literature V20, 1982, p 487-528.

Alan Krueger used this opportunity to study the comparative effects of the raise on fast-food restaurants and low-wage employment in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, where the minimum wage remained at the federal level of \$4.25 an hour. Their data demonstrated that a modest increase in wages did not appear to cause any significant harm to employment. In some cases, a rise in the minimum wage even resulted in a slight increase in employment.

- 10.22. Card and Krueger found that after a rise in the minimum wage in New Jersey, employment actually increased by about 13 per cent relative to stores in nearby eastern Pennsylvania that continued to pay a lower rate. It was suggested that stores paying low wages were often plagued by high turnover and job vacancy rates and that the higher minimum wage may have ameliorated such problems and led to an increase in employment. Similarly Hirsch et al<sup>144</sup> examined the impact of the 2007-2009 increases in the federal minimum wage on a sample of quick-service restaurants in Georgia and Alabama and found no significant effects on employment or hours over the three years. Cost increases were instead absorbed through other channels of adjustment, including higher prices, lower profit margins, wage compression, reduced turnover, and higher performance standards. These findings were closer to the predictions of institutional or behavioural models than those of either monopsony or neo-classical labour market models.
- 10.23. The studies conducted by Card and Krueger , Katz and Krueger and Hirsch et al have not gone unchallenged. David Neumark and William Wasche (1992) questioned whether the “natural experiment” approach failed to consider lagged effects of minimum wages, and also suggested it did not control for the school enrolment rate, knowing that such a variable may have an endogenous impact on teenage employment.
- 10.24. Other work by Neumark finds small but significant negative effects of living wages on the employment of low-wage workers, and positive effects on the wages of workers who remain in the labour force.<sup>145</sup> Overall, Neumark found that passing a living wage law does tend to reduce the amount of poverty in a city, but this benefit comes at the cost of some jobs.
- 10.25. Alison Wellington<sup>146</sup> found that the disemployment effects of the minimum wage were rather insignificant, since a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage was estimated to reduce teenage (16-20 year olds) employment by less than 1 per cent.

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<sup>144</sup> “Minimum wage channels of adjustment”, by Hirsch, B. T & B. E. Kaufman, et al. (2011) Research Paper Series, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies.

<sup>145</sup> “Living Wages: Protection For or Protection from Low-Wage Workers?”, by David Neumark, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, October 2004, p 27-51.

<sup>146</sup> “Effects of the minimum wage on the employment status of youths”, by Alison J. Wellington, The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, 1991, p27-46.

- 10.26. In the United Kingdom, the Low Pay Commission in its fourth report stated that between 1999 and 2003 the impact of the national minimum wage on employment levels - which overall had continued to increase in the UK - was negligible.<sup>147</sup> Indeed, employment growth had been “stronger than average” among the groups and sectors most affected by the national minimum wage.
- 10.27. Previously consideration had been given to the fact that employment may have risen faster in the absence of a minimum wage, but an econometric analysis for the third report concluded that “even after controlling for this and other factors, the impact of the minimum wage was broadly neutral.” The report found that the only exception was among young people where employment rates had fallen. After analysing the trends and related research evidence the Commission concluded that these changes in the youth labour market had been “primarily driven by the economic cycle, and that the minimum wage has had at most a minor impact on young people’s employment.”
- 10.28. Dan Finn from the University of Portsmouth noted that the introduction of the national minimum wage also has not had the dire consequences for employment levels predicted by the Conservative Government.<sup>148</sup>
- 10.29. Mark Stewart in a study entitled “The Impact of the Introduction of the UK Minimum Wage on the Employment Probabilities of Low Wage Workers”<sup>149</sup> found that the evidence suggests zero, or if anything small positive employment effects for adult men, young men and young women.
- 10.30. Youcef Ghellab of the ILO has concluded that there is no consensus among economists, at least in three countries, namely Netherlands, the United States and the United Kingdom as regards the minimum wage effects on employment. The studies concluding that the minimum wage has caused job-losses have been challenged by other studies suggesting that: (a) the minimum wage had no negative impact on youth employment (Netherlands); (b) there is no evidence that the activities of the minimum wage councils acted as a restraint on employment in Britain in the 1980s (United Kingdom); (c) the federal minimum wage increase, at least following its 1990 and 1991 uprating, did not lead to employment contraction (United States).
- 10.31. Ghellab states:<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>147</sup> “The National Minimum Wage in the United Kingdom”, by Dan Finn, Institut Arbeit und Technik, Gelsenkirchen 2005, p36.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid, p48.

<sup>149</sup> “The Impact of the Introduction of the UK Minimum Wage on the Employment Probabilities of Low Wage Workers”, Mark Stewart, 2002, Warwick Economic Research Papers, no. 630, University of Warwick, U.K., available at [http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1560/1/WRAP\\_Stewart\\_twerp630.pdf](http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1560/1/WRAP_Stewart_twerp630.pdf)

<sup>150</sup> “Minimum Wages and Youth Unemployment”, by Youcef Ghellab, ILO, 1998, p.58.

All in all, it seems fair to conclude that the existing evidence supports both positions in the debate. Whether a minimum wage has a negative or a positive effect depends on many factors such as, its relative level, the structure of the labour market and the country concerned.

10.32. Alan Manning has also noted:<sup>151</sup>

The impact of the minimum wages on employment should primarily be an empirical study and the results of these empirical studies should be used to inform policy.

10.33. Following on from Card and Krueger's work, there have been significant developments in the methodology of minimum wage research which are reviewed below. However, Ghellab's and Manning's point remains. New Zealand can learn a lot from overseas studies, but while there will be some factors which will be relatively common to labour markets across many different countries, there will be vital country-specific elements.

10.34. It is therefore the case that any analysis in a New Zealand context needs to draw on the more recent analysis of the behaviour of the labour market. What this has shown is that it is unlikely that an increase in the minimum wage would have an impact on employment.

10.35. A study by Tim Maloney of the period 1985 to 1993 showed that a 10 percent increase in the adult minimum wage produced a decline of 3.8 percent in the employment of young adults.<sup>152</sup> This was broadly consistent with evidence from the United States. Maloney found that employers started to reduce the employment of young adults and then started hiring teenagers not then covered by a minimum wage: a substitution effect.

10.36. Simon Chapple found some evidence that was consistent with Maloney's estimates, but his overall assessment was that increases in the real minimum wage showed minimal impact on employment rates. Chapple suggests that "conclusions regarding significant negative employment effects from real minimum wages increases are strikingly non-robust".<sup>153</sup>

10.37. Gail Pacheco and Tim Maloney compared the employment trends of two groups, females with no school or post-school qualifications, and females with school and post-school qualifications.<sup>154</sup> The study tested the

<sup>151</sup> "Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labour Markets", by Alan Manning, Princeton University Press, 2003, p19.

<sup>152</sup> "Does the adult minimum wage affect employment and unemployment in New Zealand?" by Tim Maloney, New Zealand Economic Papers, Vol. 29, No. 1, June 1995, p1-19.

<sup>153</sup> "Do minimum wages have an adverse impact on employment? Evidence from New Zealand", by Simon Chapple, Labour Market Bulletin, Department of Labour, 1997.

<sup>154</sup> "Does the minimum wage reduce the employment prospects of unqualified New Zealand women?", by Gail A and Tim Maloney, Labour Market Bulletin, No, Department of Labour 1999.

hypothesis of disemployment effects associated with changes in the real minimum wage between 1985 and 2000. The only significant finding appeared to be that, on average, a 1 per cent rise in the adult minimum wage caused a 14 per cent fall, two quarters later, in the employment ratio of females with no qualifications. However, most importantly, the long run employment impact of the minimum wage on this particular labour market group was found to be effectively zero.

- 10.38. Dean Hyslop and Steve Stillman found that a 69 per cent increase in the minimum wage for 18 and 19-year-olds in 2001 and a 41 per cent increase in the minimum wage for 16 and 17-year-olds over a two year period had no adverse effects on youth employment or hours worked.<sup>155</sup> In fact hours of work increased for 16-17 year olds relative to other age groups. This is a strong contrast to the studies quoted overseas and the Maloney study in New Zealand which have argued that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage would result in up to a 3 per cent increase in unemployment.
- 10.39. The most recent study in New Zealand is also by Hyslop and Stillman<sup>156</sup>. It considered the effects of the very sharp increase in minimum wage that occurred in April 2008 for 16 and 17 year olds. There was no increase in the rate of 16-17 year old unemployment as a result.
- 10.40. It shows an increase in the employment rate among 16-17 year old non-students of 3 percentage points. While it concludes that the change lowered employment for the age group overall by 3-6 percentage points in the two years following the change, with no significant effect in the first year, the loss of employment was largely borne by 16-17 year old students, to some extent to the benefit of 18-19 year old students. However the loss of employment was more than offset by an increase in those studying without working, resulting in no change in unemployment. Indeed, there was a reduction in the rate of inactivity among 16-17 year olds (those not in employment, education or training). The changes appear to have encouraged more 16-17 year olds to continue in education; a positive long term outcome for that age group.
- 10.41. Given the very large increase in the 16-17 year old minimum wage – 28 percent in real terms, and affecting most 16-17 year olds in work (60-70 percent were below the adult minimum in 2007), these findings are remarkable.

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See also “Changing role of Minimum Wage in New Zealand”, by Gail Pacheco, *New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations*, Vol 32 (3), 2008, pp.2-17.

<sup>155</sup> “Youth Minimum Wage Reform and the Labour Market”, by Dean Hyslop and Steven Stillman, NZ Treasury Working Paper 04/03, March 2004.

<sup>156</sup> “The Impact of the 2008 Youth Minimum Wage Reform”, by Dean Hyslop, and Steven Stillman, 2011., Wellington, New Zealand: Department of Labour. Available at: <http://www.dol.govt.nz/publications/research/impact-2008-youth-minimum-wage-reform/exec-summary.asp>.

- 10.42. Internationally, the position that an increase in the minimum wage has no significant effect on employment is finding increasing recent evidence.
- 10.43. An international review of minimum wage studies of the impact of minimum wages on the youth labour market organised by the U.K. Low Pay Commission, was published in March 2011<sup>157</sup>. It covered 12 countries and concluded that “The size of employment effects from the introduction of increases in minimum wages for young people in general are extremely small and on the margins of statistical significance in the great majority of studies surveyed”. While “the impact of minimum wages upon the youth labour market is more likely to be negative where there is no separate subminimum (minima) for younger workers as for example in Spain”, it also concluded that “the method by which the minimum wage is set is relevant, with systems which set rates by collective bargaining less likely to experience negative employment effects.”
- 10.44. On New Zealand it concluded that “the literature indicates the following conclusions. First, there were no or very small effects of the minimum wage on employment for the 20-24 age group. There were varied findings on the impact of rises in the minimum wage on employment for younger age groups, with estimates ranging from ‘non-robust’, to zero or fairly weak negative effects (Chapple, Hyslop and Stillman). The employment elasticity for 16-17 year-olds in 2003 in Hyslop and Stillman (2007) was -0.1 to -0.2: this is consistent with other literature.”
- 10.45. A substantial US meta-analysis was published by Hristos Doucouliagos and T.D. Stanley in 2009<sup>158</sup>. One of its motivations was to test criticisms of Card and Krueger. It re-analysed 64 US minimum-wage studies including 39 relating to teenagers. These studies included 1,474 empirical estimates of the minimum-wage elasticity of employment. They found not only bias in selection of published studies towards ones which show an adverse effect for employment, but that once such effects were corrected for, there was a small positive effect between an increase in the minimum wage and employment. Even without correcting for selection effects, adverse effects were so minimal (a doubling of the minimum wage would lead to only a 1 percent decrease in teenage employment) that they had no policy implications.
- 10.46. They specifically rebutted Neumark and Wascher. In explanation of the positive effect, they conjectured that it could be explained by monopsonistic or oligopolistic competition, efficiency wage theory, or other non-neoclassical theories of labour. They also found evidence that there is a structural effect of firms adapting to real increases in the minimum wage over time.

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<sup>157</sup> “The impact of Minimum Wages on the Youth Labour Market, an International Literature Review for the Low Pay Commission”, by Richard Croucher and Geoff White, March 2011.

<sup>158</sup> “Publication Selection Bias in Minimum-Wage Research? A Meta-Regression Analysis”, by Hristos Doucouliagos and T.D. Stanley, *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 47:2, June 2009, pp. 406-428.

- 10.47. There have been several substantial studies further developing the methodology of Card and Krueger. They have covered a number of issues including teenage employment, long-run effects and business cycle effects.
- 10.48. Economist Arindrajit Dube, along with colleagues William Lester, Sylvia Allegretto and Michael Reich, have conducted several studies taking advantage of the fact that many states in the US have their own minimum wages at a level above the federal minimum. By comparing firms operating in counties on either sides of borders of states with different minimum wages, they have been able to isolate employment effects of minimum wage increases and consistently find no significant effect on employment.
- 10.49. In one, Dube, Lester and Reich<sup>159</sup> compared contiguous counties across state borders, over 64 different border segments with minimum wage differences over a 17-year period (1990-2006). Employment effects were positive rather than negative but not statistically significant, over the short or long run. Given the long period it covered, it spanned several recessions, and subsequent analysis by one of the co-authors finds that “the overall results hold when only recession periods are considered.”<sup>160</sup> The impact of business cycles is discussed further below.
- 10.50. In September 2011, Dube summarised the state of minimum wage research,<sup>161</sup> contrasting the Neumark and Wascher ‘state panel’ approach with that of Card and Krueger, and Dube and colleagues’ own approach. The state panel approach “uses only differences in minimum wages across states to form inference... [which] effectively compares all states to all states, while accounting for possible differences by including statistical controls”. Neumark and Wascher have tended to find negative effects while the contrasting approach has in general found no or positive effects.
- 10.51. Dube views the critical difference as being that the Neumark and Wascher approach “assumes that we can find enough control variables to include in our regression that will make Texas look like Massachusetts. As it turns out, this is a heroic assumption that badly biases the results.”
- 10.52. Dube continues: “in other words, there is a very strong regional component to the minimum wage variation. This can lead to very misleading inference if we compare teen employment growth in, say, Texas and Massachusetts.

<sup>159</sup> “Minimum Wage Effects Across State Borders: Estimates Using Contiguous Counties”, by Arindrajit Dube, T. William Lester, and Michael Reich, *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, November 2010, 92(4): 945–964.

<sup>160</sup> “An Increased Minimum Wage Is Good Policy Even During Hard Times”, by T. William Lester, David Madland, and Nick Bunker, 7 June, 2011, available at [http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2011/06/higher\\_minimum\\_wage.html](http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2011/06/higher_minimum_wage.html).

<sup>161</sup> “Minimum Wage Laws and the Labor Market: What Have We Learned Since Card and Krueger’s Book *Myth and Measurement?*”, Arindrajit Dube, 1 September 2011, <http://www.newdeal20.org/2011/09/01/minimum-wage-laws-and-the-labor-market-what-have-we-learned-since-card-and-kruegers-book-myth-and-measurement-57160/>.

Given factors such as climate, proximity to Mexico, and others that are usually not fully accounted for in state panel approaches, we might expect very different trends in employment in those states quite apart from minimum wages. Similarly, the growth rate in low-wage jobs has been quite different in states like Texas, North Dakota, and Indiana even though these states have had the same binding minimum wage (i.e., the federal) over the past two decades. Unless one controls for the ‘unobserved’ (or more accurately ‘not directly observed’) sources of heterogeneity in the growth prospects across areas, conclusions may be badly flawed.”

- 10.53. Allegretto, Dube, Reich and Zipperer have developed this thinking further in a more recent empirical and critical methodological study which *inter alia* responds specifically to Neumann and Wascher.<sup>162</sup>
- 10.54. It appears then that the closer a study can control dynamically for the specific characteristics of different labour markets that occur within the country, usually defined by locality (such as state or county in the US), and in some cases additionally an employment subsector, the less likely it is to find negative employment effects. This includes differences such as business cycles, seasonality, and wage and age patterns. It may not be enough to control by using fixed effects models (where the differences between localities are assumed to be the same throughout the period of study). Or put the other way, studies that fail to control properly for these local differences may spuriously detect negative employment effects.
- 10.55. John Addison, McKinley Blackburn, and Chad Cotti have made similar findings to Dube and his colleagues, covering the US retail trade sector<sup>163</sup>, the effect of the current recession<sup>164</sup>, and a re-examination of the restaurant-and-bar sector<sup>165</sup>. The first of these studies found employment effects were eliminated by controlling quite coarsely for locality using just the nine Census divisions in the US.
- 10.56. The second study was particularly interested in the significant rise in the US Federal minimum wage. It increased by 41 percent in three US\$0.70 steps

<sup>162</sup> Allegretto, S., Dube, A., Reich, M., & Zipperer, B. (2013). Credible Research Designs for Minimum Wage Studies (Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series No. 7638). Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley. Retrieved from <http://ideas.repec.org/p/cdl/indrel/qt3hk7s3fw.html>.

<sup>163</sup> “Do Minimum Wages Raise Employment? Evidence from the U.S. Retail-Trade Sector”, John T. Addison, McKinley L. Blackburn, and Chad D. Cotti, 2009. *Labour Economics*, vol. 16(4), pages 397-408, August.

<sup>164</sup> “Minimum Wage Increases in a Soft U.S. Economy”, John T. Addison, McKinley L. Blackburn, and Chad D. Cotti, 2011, Institute for Advanced Studies. Available at: <http://ideas.repec.org/p/ihs/ihsesp/273.html>.

<sup>165</sup> “The Effect of Minimum Wages on Labor Market Outcomes: County-Level Estimates from the Restaurant-and-Bar Sector”, John T. Addison, McKinley L. Blackburn, and Chad D. Cotti, 2011, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis. Available at: <http://ideas.repec.org/p/rim/rimwps/02-08.html>.

from July 2007 to July 2009 to reach US\$7.25. No loss in employment was found. In it, Addison et al argue that while there is a concern that in periods of economic downturn any disemployment effects of the minimum wage would be considerably larger than those typically reported in periods of economic buoyancy, this is misplaced as minimum-wage workers are apparently concentrated in sectors of the economy for which the labour demand response to statutory wage hikes is minimal.

- 10.57. As an example they give a study of the US federal minimum wage increases between July 2007 and July 2009 by William Even and David Macpherson.<sup>166</sup> They estimated elasticities for 16-19 year olds in the range -0.19 to -0.32, and at the higher levels of each range with the inclusion of lagged effects. “Superficially at least, there was therefore some suggestion of an uptick in implied disemployment effects,” according to Addison et al. However they found that these results did not hold up after they controlled for trends more precisely and weighted estimates appropriately.
- 10.58. James Holmes, Patricia Hutton and Jeffrey Burnette<sup>167</sup> found that there are “substantial, significant negative employment effects in contractions and insignificant positive effects in expansions that apparently cancel out when the data are pooled. The statistical results support the hypothesis of changing regimes and suggest that minimum wage policy should depend upon the phase of the business cycle”. Addison et al however point to the wider ranging study by Allegretto, Dube and Reich<sup>168</sup> which looked at the effects on teenage employment, again finding no employment effect, and that the finding held over recession periods. It tests for the role of the cycle over the period 1990-2009 using both cross section and time series variation in the unemployment rate. It does not find evidence that employment effects vary in different parts of the business cycle. Neither interaction terms of minimum wages with unemployment rates nor the joint effect of the minimum wage and the unemployment rate prove statistically significant.
- 10.59. Addison and Blackburn et al<sup>169</sup> considered the impact of (apparently) large minimum wage increases during recessionary periods, particularly whether

<sup>166</sup> “The Teen Employment Crisis: The Effects of the 2007-2009 Federal Minimum Wage Increases on Teen Employment”, by William Even and David Macpherson, July 2010, Employment Policies Institute.

<sup>167</sup> “The Minimum Wage, Teenage Employment and the Business Cycle”, by James Holmes, Patricia Hutton and Jeffrey Burnette, 2009, unpublished paper, State University of New York at Buffalo, available at <http://www.economics.buffalo.edu/contrib/people/faculty/documents/41109minwage.pdf>.

<sup>168</sup> “Do Minimum Wages Really Reduce Teen Employment? Accounting for Heterogeneity and Selectivity in State Panel Data”, by A. Allegretto, A. Dube and M. Reich, *Industrial Relations*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (April 2011). Also available at <http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/7jq2q3j8>.

<sup>169</sup> “Minimum wage increases under straightened circumstances”, by J. T Addison, M. L. Blackburn, et al, 2011, Bonn, Germany, Institution for the Study of Labour.

disemployment effects were more readily observable. Using three different data sets and several estimation strategies for handling geographically-disparate trends they found little evidence of negative employment effects and none of a ‘recessionary multiplier’ on any such effects.

- 10.60. The way in which firms adjust to increases in the minimum wage has also been investigated. In 2011 Tetyana Zelenska completed a study of the 2007-9 increases in the US federal minimum wage.<sup>170</sup> It tracked store-level payroll records for individual employees in quick-service restaurant chains in Georgia and Alabama. The impact of the increases in the minimum wage varied significantly across restaurants, but the analysis found no negative effect on employment and hours. The author went on to interview managers and employees as to the “channels of adjustment” used to address the increased cost.
- 10.61. Twenty-three different cost-saving measures were identified. While some were simply speed-up and some also indicated pay rises may be more limited, most were forms of productivity improvement either directly or through improved management including building employee skills and involvement. Contrary to some predictions, very few managers said they would reduce training, reduce the number of people on the payroll or hire more teenage workers. The payroll records showed a lower worker attrition rate over the 2007-2009 period. Employees strongly supported the wage rises (91 percent in favour) while showing clear evidence of understanding the mechanisms that would be used to offset the higher costs.
- 10.62. Managers reduced profit margins and increased prices, though this was limited by competition. Wage compression and lower turnover rates also reduced costs. Despite mandates from owners to keep labour costs below a fixed percentage of sales value, managers found other ways to cope rather than reduce hours or lay employees off. In other words, the wage pressures induced productivity gains that would otherwise not have been sought.
- 10.63. Colm McLaughlin<sup>171</sup> compares Denmark to New Zealand and argues that raising the minimum wage will “shock” firms into raising productivity if there are strong incentives and pressures for them to do so. Using the Danish experience, he suggests a coordinated approach incorporating employers, government supported institutions including funding for training, and an active union movement with legislatively supported industry bargaining mechanisms. These should work together to support investment in skills and training which are an essential contributor to enhancing productivity. He concludes that “the coordination mechanisms between employers and unions at various levels of the economy play a pivotal role in ensuring that

<sup>170</sup> “Channels of Adjustment in Labor Markets: The 2007-2009 Federal Minimum Wage Increase”, by Tetyana Zelenska, 2011, Economics Dissertations, Georgia State University, Paper 70, [http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/econ\\_diss/70](http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/econ_diss/70).

<sup>171</sup> “The Productivity-Enhancing Impacts of the Minimum Wage: Lessons from Denmark and New Zealand”, Colm McLaughlin, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 47:2 June 2009, pp. 327–348.

the funding is used effectively through an ongoing process of developing, implementing and reviewing training programmes.”

- 10.64. Rizov and Croucher<sup>172</sup> examined the longitudinal impact of the UK national minimum wage on firm productivity. Using the FAME dataset of firm-specific productivity measures of firm-specific productivity and a semi-parametric estimation algorithm that allowed them to control for supply and demand factors affects they modelled the impact of the national minimum wage on firm productivity in the low-paying sector. They found that the aggregate low-paying sector productivity had been significantly positively affected by the NMW over a ten year period though the magnitude varied by sector and firm size, with productivity increases being more marked in larger firms
- 10.65. A study of minimum wage changes using tests for structural breaks in the data to identify the effects on employment of teenagers in Australia found that “the introduction of minimum wage legislation in Australia in 1997 and subsequent minimum wage increases appear not to have had any significant negative employment effects for teenagers”<sup>173</sup>.
- 10.66. Daniel Oesch<sup>174</sup> compared 21 OECD countries (including New Zealand) using pooled regressions over the period 1991-2006 in order to evaluate four explanations for unemployment disproportionately affecting low-skilled workers: wage-setting institutions, employment regulation, globalization and monetary policy. Oesch concluded: “We find no support for the argument that low-skilled workers’ employment prospects are hindered by legal minimum wages or strict employment protection, nor that wage inequality improves low-skilled employment. By contrast, investment in active labour market policies pays off and low real interest rates are associated with significantly less low-skilled unemployment. Hence, low-skilled workers’ job prospects seem enhanced by a combination of active labour market programmes with monetary policy that fully exploits the economy’s growth potential.”
- 10.67. Schmitt<sup>175</sup> has brought together a useful review of the research on the minimum wage of which it says: “The weight of that evidence points to little or no employment response to modest increases in the minimum wage.” In summary it says:

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<sup>172</sup> “The impact of the UK national minimum wage on productivity by low-paying sectors and firm-size groups”. By M. Rizov, and R. Croucher, 2011. Report to the Low Pay Commission.

<sup>173</sup> “Minimum Wages and Employment: Reconsidering the Use of a Time Series Approach as an Evaluation Tool”, by W.-S. Lee and S. Suardi, 2011. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 49, p.s376–s401.

<sup>174</sup> “What explains high unemployment among low-skilled workers? Evidence from 21 OECD countries”, by Daniel Oesch, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 16(1), 39-55, 2010.

<sup>175</sup> “Why Does the Minimum Wage Have No Discernible Effect on Employment?”, by John Schmitt, February 2013, Center for Economic and Policy Research. Available at <http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/min-wage-2013-02.pdf>.

The report reviews evidence on eleven possible adjustments to minimum-wage increases that may help to explain why the measured employment effects are so consistently small. The strongest evidence suggests that the most important channels of adjustment are: reductions in labour turnover; improvements in organizational efficiency; reductions in wages of higher earners ("wage compression"); and small price increases.

Given the relatively small cost to employers of modest increases in the minimum wage, these adjustment mechanisms appear to be more than sufficient to avoid employment losses, even for employers with a large share of low-wage workers.